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Abstract
The Lisbon Treaty has made Policy Coherence for Development a legal obligation for the EU, thus
the Union’s has a clear institutionalised  commitment to makes sure that non-aid policies are not
undermining the objectives in the development policy. EU’s energy policy with the 10% target of
biofuels in the transport sector have been a point of great debate. Biofuels have been contested both
within the EU and internationally and the EU's policy in this areas has created a surge for land in
developing countries in order to meet the demand for biofuels. To analyse the interplay between EU
energy and development policy, it is examined how biofuel production in Mozambique, one of the
world's  poorest  countries  and  receipient  of  EU  development  assistaince,  is  coherent  with  the
objectives for the development policy. Despite a set of sustainability criteria, issues of land rights
violations have been occuring in Mozambique and this  study shows that there is  a discrepancy
between the discursive coherence and the de facto coherence in the case of biofuels in Mozambique.
This can create loss of the Union's legitimacy as well as undermine the developmental objectives
pursuited in a developing country.
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1. Introduction
In the early 2000s, development was put on the agenda with the creation of the eight Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and the EU has made the achievement of  these by 2015 an integral
part  of  its  development  policy (Pape,  2013).  In  the  same decade,  the  EU has  also  taken on a
leadership  on  the  international  scene  for  the  combat  of  climate  change.  In  the  wake  of  this,
environmental  policy and climate change policy have become more and more intertwined with
energy policy, which has been materialised by the adoption of the Climate and Energy Package in
2008 (Buchan, 2010). In parallel, discussions on aid effectiveness have been put on the agenda and
with its nature of being the bigger donor of development aid, the EU has increasingly been framing
the disussion on policy coherence for development (PCD).  Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992
complementarity and coherence between different EU policies have been in focus and with the
Lisbon Treaty PCD became a legal obligation (Carbone 2008; Holland and Doige, 2012). Art. 208
TFEU states: “(…) The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in
the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.
It is therefore worthwhile to investigate the relationship between energy and development policy,
and consequently, in order to discuss if the EU is following its legal obligation of PCD, the nexus of
energy and development policy will be scrutinized. As an example of how energy and development
policy are related the thesis will focus on a case study of biofuels in Mozambique. The nature of
biofuels is a cross-sectional issue, which includes a lot of different policy areas such as agriculture,
energy, climate, and development all with great potential implications for developing countries. The
main issues involving biofuels in the context of this thesis are listed below:
 Renewable energy
 Reduction of GHG
 Eradication of poverty
 Legitimacy
 EU as a normative actor
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Besides the legal obligation of PCD, the EU has various fundamental principles to consider in the
policy-making.  The  importance  of  environmental  protection  is  stated  in  TFEU  art.  11
“[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation
of  the  Union  policies  and  activities,  in  particular  with  a  view  to  promoting  sustainable
development”. As an overarching principle, one of the main objectives in the environmental policy
is  the  combat  against  climate  change1 as  stated  in  TFEU  art.  191  “promoting  measures  at
international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular
combating climate change.” The environment thus has a central place in the EU's identity.
The era of the EU’s leadership role on the international climate scene began in the early 1990s
(Brandi,  2012)  and  was  underlined  by  the  Union’s  active  part  in  the  Kyoto  Protocol  (KP)
negotiations (Kelemen, 2010). Since then the EU has kept its position as a leading actor in the
climate negotiations. However, if the Union’s climate policies are creating policy incoherence with
the development policy instrumentalised through the energy policy and the 10% biofuel target, this
acclaimed leadership and legitimacy can be threatened. Accordingly, it begs the question, how a
climate norm creater concomitant with being the biggest donor of Official Development Assistance
(ODA)  can  be  conducting  policies  that  might  be  counterproductive  for  climate  change  and
sustainable development in developing countries. Thus, lack of policy coherence (PC) can raise
severe questions of legitimacy as well as concerns about policy efficiency.
1.1. Outline of the thesis
The thesis is organised as follows. Firstly, the the research question and the framework of the thesis
is  presented,  following this,  in  section  2,  there  is  a  literature  review on PCD and the  general
theoretical framework as well as a discussion of the theories of PC applied in the thesis. Finally,
section 2 also presents the theoretical use of power as defined by Hurd (1999). In section 3, the
methodology of  the  thesis  is  presented and its  shortcomings are  discussed.  Following this,  the
scientific relevance of the thesis is justified. Then in section 5 a historical overview of the EU's
development  policy  and  interaction  with  developing  countries  is  outlines,  followed  by  a
presentation of the foundation of the EU energy policy in section 6. 
1 Furthermore the environmental policy is based upon the precautionary principle (TFEU art. 191,
2). 
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The case study in this thesis, biofuels in Mozambique, is analysed in section 7 by examining the
context of biofuels as a renewable source of energy and the implications of production of biofuels in
Mozambique.  Turning to the implementation of the EU's biofuel policy,  the Renewable Energy
Directive (RED) and its connection to developing countries is discussed in section 8. Following
this, section 9 examines the nature of PCD in regards to biofuels in Mozambique. Finally, section
10 provides a conclusion of the analysis and discussions conducted in this thesis.
1.2 Research question and the framework of the thesis
The overall theme for the thesis is PCD – or lack of PC concerning a potential conflict between the
Union’s  energy policy  and  development  policy.  I  will  therefore  discuss  how different  policies
interact  and influence  each other.  More  concretely:  What  are the  implications of  the energy
policy for the development policy objectives? This raises questions about the EU as a normative
actor leading to inquiries of legitimacy.  The thesis will revolve around the research question:
How does the EU’s energy policy interact with the Union’s development policy? More concretely,
how are the implications of the EU’s biofuel policy related to the objectives in the development
policy “Agenda for Change” in the specific context of biofuels in Mozambique?
1.2.1 Theory and methods
The theoretical framework of this thesis draws on different approaches. The approach is centrered
around the framework of Carbone, (2008), Nuttal (2005), and Nilsson et al. (2012). Using this as a
stepping stone I built further on Stocchetti’s on process and outcome coherence by connecting this
conceptualisation of coherence with the notion of horizontal  coherence (HC). Secondly,  Hurd’s
(1999)  theory  of  power  and  in  a  more  narrow  sense,  normative  legitimacy,  of  the  EU  as  an
international actor will also be applied. Methodologically the thesis draws on qualitative research
strategy with application of the case study method as well  as discourse analysis.  Discussion of
theories and methods will be elaborated further in the following sections.
1.2.2 Empirical material
The data will primarily be policy documents, thus the empirical foundation of the thesis will be the
EU’s  current  development  policy, Agenda  for  Change  and  the  Country  Strategy  Paper  for
Mozambique,  as well  as the directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from
renewable sources (RED). 
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The overall goal of the development policy, which is explicitly stated in Agenda for Change is to
eradicate poverty in the context of sustainable development. The development policy focuses on
good governance including human rights and the rule of law as well as improved coherence among
EU policies (EC, 2011). 
RED has the objective of a 20% share of renewable sources in the EU’s energy mix, and more
specifically a share of 10% in EU’s transport sector should come from renewable sources2. The use
of biofuels is crucial in order to reach the 10% share in the transport sector. Furthermore the Lisbon
Treaty,  communications  and  reports  from  the  Commission  will  also  be  part  of  the  empirical
material.  Secondly  an  essential  part  of  the  empirical  material  is  semi-structured  interviews  of
appropriate stakeholders in Mozambique,  which have been conducted during fieldwork in April
2014. These stakeholders include representatives from NGOs, the private sector, the EU delegation
in Mozambique as well as the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and the Mozambican Ministry
of Energy. A list of the exact interviews can be found in appendix 1.
2 See directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.
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2. Research overview and theoretical framework of Policy Coherence 
for Development
The research on coherence has paradoxically not been “coherent”. There has been a narrow focus
on certain policy areas and broad and overlapping proposals of a theoretical framework. Generally
there has been a focus on the classic cases of incoherence e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) (Matthews, 2008), Common Fisheries Policy (Bretherton and Vogler, 2012) or the Common
Commercial Policy (CCP) (Azoulay, 2005; Stocchetti, 2013; Jr, 2013). Others have framed this as
incoherence  in  EU’s  foreign  policy  in  general  (Portela  &  Leuven,  2012)  and  the  search  for
coherence as a process of globalisation Mendoza (2007), or coherence as integration of strategies
across  policies  (Steurer,  Berger,  &  Hametner,  2010).  Meanwhile  CEPS  (2006)  provides  an
impressively  comprehensive  analysis  of  different  areas  of  external  policies  such  as  trade  and
fisheries to internal policies like research and transport policy. Conversely, other forms of coherence
have been analysed for instance internal,  horizontal  (Solorio,  2011), and institutional coherence
(Vieira and Lange, 2012).  Simultaneously, conceptualisations and theoretical underpinnings of PC
have  been  proposed  by  different  authors,  in  particular  Nuttal  (2005)  and  Carbone
(2005;2008;2011:2013a;2013b).  Finally  it  is  worthwhile  mentioning  Sianes’ attempt  (2012)  to
conceptualise this jungle of theoretical frameworks of PC, which will be discussed in the following.
2.1 A proposal for unwildering the coherence jungle
Sianes criticises that there is no common definition of PCD and despite his visualisation of different
types of coherence, it does not add much clarity to the blurry landscape of PCD. Consequently, it
only  gives  an  overview  of  existing  definitions  and  where  they  overlap.  Other  studies  analyse
institutional actors and their influence on the PCD agenda – e.g. the role of the presidency and the
effect of the Trio for the promotion of PCD (Vieira and Lange, 2012). Their analysis reveals that
alliances  between  the  presidencies,  the  High  Representative  (HR),  and  the  President  of  the
European Council can be very beneficial for the promotion of PCD3.
3 Addiotonally, they assert that coherence can be improved through horizontal coordination via the
presendency, which can complement the vertical coherence through the HR and the President of the
European Council.
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Figure 1. Conceptual map on Policy Coherence for Development. (Sianes, 2013).
As figure 1 above shows many of the designations of difference types of coherence overlap and
different authors use different notions for the same phenomenon. Thus, following the literature of
PC, internal coherence can cover both coherence within aid policy but also within a greater range of
policies as is the case with foreign policy (FP), where development policy is just one aspect of FP.
As it is also showed above, HC is used by some, while external coherence covers aid (and FP)
versus other domestic policy areas. Lastly with relevance for this thesis is vertical coherence (VC),
which Carbone uses for consistency between different levels of governments, which is also called
institutional coherence – the latter will be discussed below.
Mendoza (2007) explains the emergence of PCD as a result of the increased globalisation and its
policy externalities. The author frames very well the essence of PCD as “What One Hand Gives the
Other One Takes” (Mendoza 2007:36) and outlines policy contradictions of the US and EU. Thus,
in  this  case  the  different  policies  are  not  mutually  supportive  but  in  fact  trade  policies  are
undermining the efforts of the development policies.
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2.2 Discussion of the theoretical Framework
PC is an objective that has become increasingly important within the EU as well as its member
states (MS), when it comes to governance and policy-making (Nilsson et al. 2012). The concept of
PCD originated in the early 1990s within the context of the Development Assistance Committee and
gained further prominence with the MDGs (Bretherton and Vogler, 2012). In the same vein, PC is
pursued within the agenda of better regulation followed by both the EU and OECD and has been
manifested for instance by strategies of sustainable development (Nilsson et al., 2012). Meanwhile,
Forster  and  Stokke  with  their  1999  publication  were  the  first  ones  to  identify  and  categorise
different types of coherence4 in the context of development policy. Hoebink takes this further and
applies it to the EU (Stocchetti, 2013).
Consistency (and coherence) is a concept, which has a long history within the EU. Already in 1974
it was mentioned in an official document and to act in a consistent manner was made explicit in the
preamble  to  the  Single  European  Act  (SEA)  in  1987  (Nuttal,  2005).  At  this  time  it  was  the
responsibility of the MS to ensure the observance of consistency alongside the Commission. The
MS transferred this obligation to the presidency to become more operational (Nuttal, 2005). Today,
consistency and coherence are used interchangeably in most of the literature (Nuttal 2005; Carbone
2008),  which  is  why I  will  use  both  coherence  and consistency as  an  expression  of  the  same
phenomenon, when these authors are referenced. Nevertheless, I will take this further and built on
Stocchetti’s framework, where she distinguishes exactly between consistency and coherence. I find
this important, since the EU development policy was established as an area within the Union’s
competence with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992/3, where also the triple C5 was created and given
legal recognition. These were made into the four Cs adding the principle of consistency with the
Amsterdam Treaty in the late 1990s (Stocchetti, 2013; Holland and Doige 2012). Hence albeit used
interchangeably in the literature, the EU discerns the three designations (at least on paper), and by
explicitly having made commitments to increased policy coherence for development. 
2.2.1 Different types of coherence – a varied and intertwined landscape 
The literature on PC is not coherent but with many overlapping notions of the same phenomenon as
discussed above. Nevertheless, Nilsson et al. (2012) identify three main types, that is, horizontal,
vertical and internal coherence (Nilsson et al., 2012). 
4 The types of coherence proposed can be found in the overview in figure 1 above
5 The triplce C denotes the principles of coordination, complementarity, and coherence 
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However  Nuttal  (2005)  discusses  three  different  types  of  consistency  (or  coherence),  namely
vertical,  horizontal,  and institutional.  This indeed reflects  the overlapping of notions within the
literature  on  the  framework  of  coherence  theory  as  shown  above  with  figure  1.  Vertical
(in)consistency refers  to  different  levels  of  governance for  instance when one or  more MS are
pursuing policies, which are not in line with the policies agreed in the EU (Nuttal, 2005). Hence,
VC is about coherence across different spatial levels of governance. In regards to the EU, this could
be EU development policy that either conflicts or is in synergy with development policy at MS level
(Nilsson et al., 2012). HC refers to EU policies in general that have different objectives, which have
external  implications  that  are  not  always  taken into  account  (Nuttal,  2005).  Some of  the  most
striking examples include agriculture, environment, transport, competition policy, public health, and
consumer protection. Although all of these policy areas are domestic in their nature and origin, they
can  nevertheless  have  significant  impacts  outside  of  the  EU in  other  parts  of  the  world.  This
incoherence needs to be managed if negative consequences are to be avoided (Nuttal, 2005). Thus,
contrary to VC, HC is about coherence at the same level of governance e.g. across policy domains
such as transport and environmental policy (Nilsson et al., 2012) or energy and development policy
in regards to this thesis. Horizontal consistency implies therefore coherence across policy areas,
which means that there should be coherence between different parts of the EU’s policies pursuing
different policy objectives. Eventually, the policies should at least not be “involuntarily incoherent”
(Nuttal, 2005:97). HC will be elaborated further later in this section, since it is the main focus of the
thesis6. 
2.2.2 The nexus nature of coherence
Consistence is not a single phenomenon but instead “a nexus of different problems” to which the
solutions are various and not necessarily compatible (Nuttal,  2005:92).  Thus, there are inherent
trade-offs in dealing with coherence and deciding, what aspects and objectives should prevail at the
expense of the other. 
6  The third main type of coherence identified in the literature is institutioanl coherence. I will not 
elaborate on this, since it is not the focus of the thesis and due to space limits. However it can 
briefly be describes as a situation where two sets of actors – Commission and the HR/European 
External Action Service (EEAS) – are active in the same policy area with different sets of 
procedures as is the case of the EU’s common foreign policy. Hence it can be seen as two different 
approaches to one and same problem (Nuttal, 2005). This is particular present in the area of 
development policy, where both the Commission and the EEAS are institutions with competence in 
the area. Thus, two different “government actors” have competence to either coordinate, regulate, or
implement.
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Meanwhile a mistaken assumption about consistency assumes that foreign policy considerations
must prevail in case of lack of consistence at the expense of domestic policies (Nuttal, 2005).
On the contrary, Nuttal argues that by giving the domestic policy the upper hand, it might represent
a more democratic  outcome (Nuttal,  2005:92).  Conversely,  to  give the upper  hand to domestic
policies can impact negatively on EU’s external image – if consistency is not desirable for its own
sake, it is nevertheless for the credibility of the EU (Nuttal, 2005). Hence one might not care about
potential conflict and inconsistencies between different policies but the incoherence can impairs the
EU’s image, and thus the Union’s leverage in the international arena (Nuttal, 2005). I will return to
the discussion of legitimacy and the EU later in this section. 
2.3 Consistency versus coherence  - a theoretical discussion
I will now turn built on the framework developed by Stocchetti (2013) about the difference between
consistency and coherence.  Overall  consistence refers to  a  rather  static  condition that  does  not
change, whereas coherence on the contrary denotes something more dynamic and can be related to
a  degree of  coherence  as  Stocchetti  suggests  (2013:28).  Coherence  is  thus  something  that  is
assessed against something else, that is, in this case whether or not energy policy is coherent with
development policy. In this view Stocchetti suggests that coherence can be regarded as a process -
hence how something is achieved. Or coversely, as an outcome – what has been achieved. 
2.3.1 Process coherence and institutional coherence versus outcome coherence and horizontal 
coherence
Relating this  to Nuttal’s  three types of coherence (2005),  the institutional coherence is  process
coherence,  since  institutional  coherence  designates  a  struggle  to  alignment  actions  of  different
“governments”  as  described  above,  see  footnote  5  –  thus  it  emphasises  how the  coherence  is
achieved. Therefore, I argue that the institutional structures directing policy-making as well as the
treaty articles,  which define the Union’s  actions and competences,  the interaction and relations
between  the  different  institutions  and  policies,  means  that  institutional  coherence  and  process
coherence are different sides of the same coin. This is because the institutional coherence can be
regarded as the process (the lack of coherence can be a result of turf battling between different
insitutions) towards achieving agreed policy objectives e.g. between the Commission and the EEAS
in the area of development policy. 
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This is a helpful “boxing” in my attempt to categorise the jungle of overlapping concepts in the
theoretical  framework  of  PC  (for  development).  Moving  further  on  in  the  analysis  of  an  apt
theoretical framework for this thesis, I will now focus on outcome coherence. 
As stated above, this type of coherence focuses on what is achieved and hence it is result-oriented.
Concerning  energy  versus  development  policy,  it  relates  to  the  consequences  of  HC  or  more
specifically  for  this  thesis,  how  potential  incoherence  between  the  two  policy  areas  affect
development objectives. This in turn leads to the discussion of the EU’s legitimacy as a normative
power, because lack of coherence and consistency can have implications for the Union’s image in
external relations. I therefore place HC in the realm of outcome coherence. The last point I want to
discuss  is  the  concepts  of  internal  and  external  coherence  and  how  these  relate  to  the  other
theoretical literature on coherence. Internal coherence as it is presented by (Nilsson et al., 2012) is
coherence within a single policy area.  This means that  within a  given policy e.g.  development
policy or  energy policy the objectives  should not  be contradictory.  This  can seem as  a natural
inference, however competing objectives are not uncommon in for instance energy policy. The EU
itself has identified how the Union’s policies have a strong impact on developing countries and
among those mentioned by the Commission, climate, energy and environment are relevant to this
thesis (EC 2011). Conversely, from an internal perspective, the energy policy should with regard to
the need to preserve and improve the environment aim at promoting the development of new and
renewable forms of energy but the MS remain “the right to determine the conditions for exploiting
its  energy sources,  its  choice  between different  energy sources  and the general  structure of  its
energy supply without prejudice to Article 192 (2) (c)” art. 192 (2) TFEU. 
This  formulation  is  consequently  a  manifestation  of  a  materialised  internal  and  institutional
incoherence, since the promotion of renewable energy is inherently in conflict with MS' right to
”determine the conditions for exploiting its  energy sources,  its  choice between different  energy
sources”, when having in mind the great amounts of coal that some MS possess and legitimately
insist on using. Furthermore, the explicit objective of 20% renewable energy in the energy mix by
the year  2020 also has  the potential  to  collide with the MS’ right  to  choose between different
sources of energy. Thus, internal and institutional incoherence are occurring in the EU’s policies as
these two examples show. 
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To relate  this  to  what  Nilsson  et  al.  (2012)  call  external  coherence,  which  denotes  coherence
between different sectorial policies, the very same objective of a 20% renewable share in the energy
mix can be interpreted as “measures significantly affecting the Member State’s choice between
different  energy sources and the general  structure of  its  energy supply” (TFEU Art.  192.2(C)),
thereby  granting  a  veto  right  to  the  MS  if  such  measures  are  occurring.  This  does  not  only
potentially undermine the achievement of the 20% renewable energy target, it is also incoherent
with the main objective of the Union’s environmental policy to combat climate change as stated in
art.  191(1) TFEU. Hence a clear incoherence between different sectorial policies exists, thereby
constituting a case of external incoherence. The reason why this is a relevant example related to the
energy-development  coherence  nexus,  is  that  this  complex  relationship,  interplay,  and  inherent
connection between environment/climate policy and energy policy have great implications for the
EU’s development policy. This is exactly what this thesis intends to investigate by analysing the
case of biofuels in Mozambique as a manifestation of what consequences the Union’s energy policy
has in the interaction with the development policy in a developing country. 
 2.4 A level playing field for coherence for development?
The  struggle  to  align  two  so  connected  policies  as  environment/climate  and  energy,  where
provisions in the energy policy about the institutional balance and veto power of the MS7 ultimately
overrule environmental (and energy) objectives even though article 11 TFEU explicitly states that
“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated in the the definition and implementation
of  the  Union’s  policies  and  activitives  in  particular  with  a  view  to  promoting  sustainable
development”, suggests that coherence for development policy might not be on a level playing field.
This  is  due  to  the  “locus”  of  environmental  and  development  provisions,  since  development
objectives are not as strongly manifested as environmental ones, which is shown by the location of
these  obligations  in  the  Treaty.  The  provision  on  environmental  protection  figures  in  the  very
beginning of the Treaty,  that is art.  11 TFEU, whereas the obligation on PCD is located much
further  down  –  art.  208  TFEU.  Moreover,  environmental  protection  is  part  of  some  general
objectives of the Union, which is  not the case for development coherence and additionally the
language in article 208 is much weaker than in art. 11 TFEU. 
7 Iterate art. TFEU Art. 192.2(C) on:“measures significantly affecting the Member State’s choice 
between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply”.
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Thus, with environmental concerns being overruled by decision-making provisions in the treaty
despite the central location of environment in the Union’s identity, makes the prospects of balancing
energy considerations with developmental ones weak.
 
PCD can be understood in two ways as Ashoff suggests (2005). The first one is a positive one,
where  coherence  between  development  and  other  policies  can  generate  synergies  and  thus,  a
possible  win-win  situation  with  a  solution  for  different  policy  objectives,  which  are  mutually
reinforcing each other. The other is on the contrary more negative, since Ashoff suggests that PCD
simply means an absence of incoherence that occur when other policies impair the effects or even
are counterproductive to the development policy either accidently or deliberately.  This negative
understanding of coherence relates to what  Nuttal  defines as an attempt to ensure that policies
should at least not be “involuntarily incoherent” (Nuttal, 2005:97). This negative understanding also
frames the situation of trade-offs between different polices determining which policy should prevail
in the end - that again can be linked to the intentional incoherence, which will be elaborated below.
Building further on this, I will link it with what Hoebink (2004) calls intentional and unintentional
incoherence. The latter occurs when policy-makers are not aware of the effects a certain policy has
on the development policy, and this can be due to lack of coordination and information, or simply
that the policy context is so complicated that it is impossible to know potential negative impacts of
a certain policy on the development  policy.  The former (intentional  incoherence)  occurs,  when
policy-makers act intentional by accepting an incoherence i.e. negative impacts of energy policy on
development policy, because it is believed that the positive impacts are more important than the
negatives ones. Thus, the intentional coherence is a trade-off between objectives in two different
policy areas.  If  intentional incoherence is prevailing in development policy due to inter alia its
weaker status as discussed above, it suggests that PCD  does not operate in a level playing field
when development objectives compete or collide with objectives in other policies.
Stocchetti focus on “how coherence works for development” (2013:33) by analysing the interplay
between EU trade policy and development policy. This seems like a natural starting point for her
analysis,  since  the  EU  has  developed  Economic  Partnership  Agreements  (EPAs)  with  several
countries  in the African,  Carribean and Pacific  (ACP) regions  and promotes  initiatives  such as
AidforTrade. 
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The emphasis on “for” implies a synergy and a mutually reinforcing situation, where both policies
benefit  and neither  has the upper  hand.  Hence this  framing of   AidforTrade articulates  a  level
playing field solution. In contrast this is not my starting point, since my point of departure is not
trade policy and its related discourse8 as mentioned above. My focus is energy policy, which by its
nature as an internal policy (in contrast to the trade policy,) may seem as the not so obvious part of
the coherence nexus – development versus energy. 
The concept of PCD is inherently politically sensitive, since it implies an assessment of the impacts
of  non-aid  policies  on  the  objectives  of  development  policy  (Stocchetti,  2013).  This  is  why it
becomes pertinent to also discuss the role of the EU as a normative actor and the Union’s legitimacy
in the international political  arena.  I will  present a useful theoretical framework for norms and
legitimacy concerning the EU in the following.
2.5 Norms, legitimacy, and the EU as an international actor
Studies of the EU have increasingly focused on the ideological or normative aspects of the Union’s
external relations (Stocchetti 2013; Rosamond 2014). These studies claim that the true power of the
EU is its ability to projects its norms and values, which then leads to a redefinition of what can be
deemed normal, acceptable, or preferable in the international arena and indeed in the context of
global governance. Meanwhile, it is important to note that this normative transfer is not by its nature
necessarily  good.  Some  norms,  values,  and  practices  that  are  being  legitimated  can  also  be
detrimental (Stocchetti 2013).
2.5.1 Coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy as different types of power 
There are traditionally three types of power and Hurd (1999) categorises these three ideal types as
coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy. In places where rules or norms exist compliance with these
norms and rules by one or a combination of the different types of power will occur (Hurd 1999).
These  places can  for  instance  be  the  international  area  in  which  the  EU  interacts  with  third
countries. I define legitimacy like Hurd suggests, where legitimacy refers to “the normative belief
by an actor  that  a  rule  or institution ought  to be obeyed”.  Legitimacy is  thereby a “subjective
quality,  relational  between  actor  and  institution,  and  defined  by  the  actor’s  perception of  the
institution” (Hurd 1999:381). 
8 I wil return to the concept of discourse in the methodology section
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This perception can originate from the procedure or source by which it was constituted or from the
substance of a rule. Applied to the EU, this means that Mozambique may find the EU a legitimate
actor in the biofuel sector – or in general – because of a substance of a rule e.g. the sustainability
criteria for biofuels in the RED. Or the perceived legitimacy can steam from the source – the EU as
a leader in the climate arena or as the biggest donor of ODA – or from the procedure, which can be
how the EU and Mozambique agree on the targets and objectives in the country strategy paper for
the  development  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  Mozambique.  However,  it  is  important  to
underline that a normative conviction of legitimacy does not automatically result in abiding of a law
or rule. In fact the contrary is often the case, meaning that a certain normative conviction can lead to
non-compliance of a rule or law (Hurd, 1999).
2.5.2 Coercion as a source of power
Hurd defines coercion as “a relation of asymmetrical physical power among agents,  where this
asymmetry is applied to changing the behavior of the weaker agent. The operative mechanism is
fear or simple ‘‘compellance’’; fear produces acquiescence” (Hurd 1999:383). Thus, an actor simply
obeys a rule, because the coercion creates a fear of punishment from the stronger actor. Coercion is
a relatively simple form of power and social control, and does not in general produce voluntary
compliance (Hurd 1999). 
2.5.3 Self-interest – a softer way 
This form of power is based on the assumption that compliance is in the actor's self-interest (Hurd,
1999).  This suggests that compliance is  a  result  of a  “cost/benefit  analysis” of non-compliance
versus compliance. Therefore, the agent with the upper hand governing the relation should provide
incentives for compliance of a certain norm (Hurd, 1999). Self-interest thus, implies a self-restraint
actor.  This  self-restraint  comes  internally from the  actor,  which is  the  difference between self-
interest and coercion, where in the case of coercion, the restraint is external (Hurd 1999). Hence, if
the power, the EU exercises over Mozambique, is based on self-interest from Mozambique’s side,
the self-restraint comes from Mozambique internally, because the country sees it as in its own self-
interest to comply with certain norms or rules.
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2.5.4 Legitimacy the third source of power
Here the compliance of a rule originates from the belief in the normative legitimacy of the rule – or
in the body, which created the rule. As suggested by Hurd (1999:387) legitimacy can be defined as
“a  generalized  perception  or  assumption  that  the  actions  of  an  entity  are  desirable,  proper,  or
appropriate within (…) [a] system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. Thus, compliance is
motivated by an interal reason for the actor to follow a certain norm or rule (Hurd, 1999). The
operationalisation of legitimacy lies in the internalisation of an external standard by an actor. This
means that the understanding of what is the actor’s own interests is constituted partly by an outside
source, which can take the form of rules, norms, standards, or laws. Thus, the power of legitimacy
in its pure form, is when an actor complies with a legitimate rule, which goes against the actor’s
own interests. However, the actor does not perceive that there is a conflict between its interests and
obligations, because a norm or rule has affected the definition of the actor’s interest (Hurd, 1999).
The relation between coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy is complex and each of them is to some
extend connected to the other and is found only rarely isolated or in its pure form (Hurd, 1999).
There is no reason for assuming coercion rather than legitimacy as a source of power and vice-
verse. Therefore,  it  is necessary to “replace assumptions with careful analysis  and observation”
(Hurd, 1999:392). Conversely, it is important to be aware of the fact that simply compling with a
norm or rule does not mean that that the compliace is a result of legitimacy. It could also be a result
of  coercion  or  self-interest.  Hence,  just  because  Mozambique  is  complying  to  norms  of  good
governance does not mean that the country perceives the EU as legitimate. Mozambique could also
feel  coerced  to  comply  –  or  see  it  as  in  its  own  interest.  To  investigate  from which  power
mechanism compliance steams, one needs a methodology, which can interpret the motives for the
compliance  rather  than  measuring  the  compliance  itself  (Hurd,  1999).  Along these  lines,  Hurd
argues that a great deal can be learned from the actor’s use of language (1999). This means that a
discourse analysis can be a helpful methodological tool, and discourse analysis will therefore also
be a part of my methodology – this will be presented below in the coming section.
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3. Methods and research design
The imperative of an apt methodology is underlined by Martínez “The link between theory and
practice is underpinned by method, which comprises the necessary tools to extract data from the
analysis of the text” (2007:126). The chosen method for this thesis is the case study method as well
as  discourse  analysis.  The  data  will  be  collected  through  qualitative  methods  through  semi-
structured interviews. A justification of the different choices will follow. Finally, there will be a
short  critique on the chosen methods. The empirical data consists of two different components,
namely  discourse  analysis  of  policy  documents  and  semi-structured  interviews.  This  two-fold
approach is called triangulation and is used to increase the validity of the research. In particular
triangulation  is  one  of  the  strengths  of  the  case  study  methods  (Adcock  and  Collier  2001).
Triangulation means that the researcher  uses more than one method or source of data,  thus by
complementing each other,  the different sources of data give greater confidence in the findings
(Bryman,  2012).  Therefore  by  observing  the  studied  phenomenon  from multiple  perspectives,
triangulation is achieved (Neuman, 2011).
Bryman  (2012)  identifies  differences  between  quantitative  and  qualitative  research.  Whereas
qualitative research is characterised by words, viewpoint of the participants, the researcher is close,
the research is a process, data is rich and deep, micro setting, it is unstructured, the understanding is
contextual, the focus is on meaning and the settings are natural. In this regard, I will consider some
of them important to why I have chosen a qualitative research approach. All of these concepts are
applicable to my research. First of all there will be a strong focus on words, since policy documents
and interviews are key sources of data. The setting is both micro and natural, the latter since it takes
place in Mozambique, where I as a researcher go to the stakeholders’ environment and conduct part
of the data collection. The former (micro) again due to the location of Mozambique but in terms of
Mozambique as only one country in the big context of ACP countries, with which the EU provides
ODA. The micro aspect is also prevalent in regards to the specific issue of biofuels in the case
study. Energy policy covers an array of different aspects and policy measures but the thesis focus on
biofuels in Mozambique.
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3.1 The case study method
The chosen research design is the case study method. This particular research design is chosen due
to its applicability of the research question. A case study can be defined as “an intensive analysis of
a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units” (Gerring, 2004:341). 
In particular a case study focus on the complexity and the special nature of the case in question
(Bryman, 2012). In the same vein the qualitative case study methodology provides tools to study
complex phenomena within their contexts (Baxter and Jack, 2008).
This is  an apt design for my research question,  since I  wish to investigate the interactions and
interlinkages between the EU’s energy and development policy. My specific case is Mozambique,
where the EU has highlighted biofuels as an important component in the Mozambican energy sector
in the EU’s development cooperation with the country.
3.2. Advantages of qualitative research applicable for this study
The chosen research question is in its nature qualitative, since I aim to examine to what extent the
EU’s energy policy influences the development policy and thus, it is a how question in a qualitative
sense and not e.g. how many policies areas the EU’s energy policy potential influence, which is
more of a quantitative research question. Yin (2003) emphasises that case study is applicable, when
the  focus  of  the  study  is  to  answer  how  and  when  the  researcher wants  to  cover  contextual
conditions because s/he believes they are relevant  to the studied phenomenon.While quantitative
data provide valuable information about for instance the profile of poverty over time and space,
qualitative data are necessary to gain a better understanding of dynamics of a certain issue (Tvedten
et al.,  2013) e.g.  in  the relation between EU energy and development  policy in this  case.  This
qualitative nature of the research question suits case study methodology well and allows to assess
how rather than a quantitative measure of how much (George and Bennett, 2005). The aim is not to
make generalisations over broad populations implying that the findings can be applied to conflicts
in other kind of policy areas; rather the kind of generalisations, which possible could be drawn
relates  to  how  a  policy  similar  to  energy  can  influence  the  development  policy.  Instead,  the
objective is to analyse the dynamics, which cause incoherence between two complex policy areas
with multiple actors and interests such as development and energy policy. Meanwhile, the aim is
nevertheless that the findings are also generalisable for other ACP countries, with which the EU has
development cooperation and thus, the findings can be applied to similar cases.
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The characteristics of a critical case have a well-developed theory and the case is chosen, since it
will enhance the understanding of the circumstances connected to a potential hypothesis (Bryman,
2012). In this thesis biofuels in Mozambique constitutes a critical case, because it will give a better
understanding of the circumstances in which there is a potential lack of PCD. Meanwhile the chosen
case also has features of what Bryman (2012) describes as the typical or representative case. This
type  of  case  encompasses  the  circumstances  and  conditions  of  a  commonplace  situation.  For
Mozambique this holds very much true as the country is located on the African continent, which the
EU focuses most on. Furthermore the emergence of a biofuel sector is highly prevalent in Eastern
and Southern Africa. 
Validity is one of the most important criteria of research (Bryman 2012). In this thesis the validity is
strengthened by the use of triangulation.  One type of triangulation is method triangulation, where
more than one method is applied (Neuman, 2011). In the case of this thesis besides the case study
method, I also use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which will be elaborated below. External
validity is concerned with generalisation beyond the specific research context. This means that in
order for my research to have such external validity it must be applicable to other policy areas.
Although external validity is most often connected to quantitative research (Bryman 2012), my aim
is to achieve external validity through the research design and use of theory in order to make the
context-specific area of energy versus development policy, generalisable, that is, it is applicable to
other policies similar to the nature of energy, which might influence the EU’s development policy.
This is important, because the number of policies that potentially can influence the development
policy is high, and it is therefore appropriate to conduct a study that to some extent is generalisable.
3.3. Discourse analysis as a method for interpreting politics
Jørgensen  and  Phillips  (2002:3)  define  discourse  as  “a  particular  way  of  talking  about  and
understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)”. Discourse theory and method thus deal with
how certain aspects  are  perceived or  framed.  This  is  a  useful  methodological  approach for the
analysis of policies and potential synergies or conflict, especially, for a normative policy area as
development. Jørgensen and Phillips (2003) present three main branches of discourse theory and
method, however for the purpose of this thesis I will only use CDA.
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One of the founders of the theories behind CDA, Norman Fairclough, has used CDA to study mass-
communication,  democracy,  and politics.  Thus,  with  its  nature,  CDA is  regarded  to  be  an  apt
methodological  approach  for  analysing  the  legitimacy  of  the  EU  as  well  as  PCD.  Following
Fairclough’s reasoning, the concept of discourse can be applied in three different ways. The first
one is the most abstract one, where discourse is language use as social practice. This means that
discourse  is  both  constituted  –  it  is  relational,  to  put  it  in  another  way  it  is  shaped  by  its
surroundings – and it is constitutive, which means that it shapes its surroundings. One step up the
ladder of abstraction, discourse refers to a certain language used in a specific field for instance in
politics that has a special political discourse. The last use of discourse applied by Fairclough is in
the very concrete manner, where discourse is simply the word, thus it is a way of speaking that
gives a meaning to an experience from a particular perspective e.g. neoliberal or environmental
discourse. Discourse therefore contributes to the constrution of systems of knowledge and meaning,
social identities, and social relations (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2003). Following this, discourse is the
language associated with a paricular practice or social field (Fairclough, 2013).
Another way of framing discourse in relation to politics and social life is to frame it as policy-as-
discourse. The argument underlying policy-as-discourse “is that issues get represented in ways that
mystify power relations and often create individuals responsible for their own ‘failures’, drawing
attention away from the structures that create unequal outcomes“ (Bacchi 2000:46). Thus the power
of  language  and  framing  policy  within  a  certain  discourse  are  significant.  Martínez  (2007)
emphasises the power of language for social life by asserting that the link between language and
social  matters  makes  language  a  tool,  which  challenges  power  and  expresses  differences  in
hierarchical  social  structures.  Following  this,  the  characteristics  of  policy-making  is  widely
recognised as being problem-solving, which CDA addresses (Fairclough, 2013). This is important,
since development EU policy has a specific goal of eradicating poverty (thus solving the problem of
poverty) and for the energy policy the promotion of renewable sources is a goal (thus solving the
problem of climate change).
3.4. Critique and reflection on the limitations of the chosen research methods
One reoccurring critique of qualitative research is that it is too subjective. This is related to the
nature of qualitative research, where the researcher is often close to the subjects studied maybe with
close personal relationships. 
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Moreover it is also linked to the “unsystematic” view of what is important and carries significance,
compared to the structured often positivistic nature of quantitative research (Bryman, 2012: 405). A
way of dealing with the critique of being unsystematic is to incorporate the features of quantitative
research, which have a strong systematic aspect such as stating the formulation of the problem in
terms of the existing literature and key theoretical ideas on the topic. This is what I have attempted
with the literature review and by outlining the theoretical framework of policy coherence in the
existing literature. Although this is not a real quantitative feature of research, it is an attempt to have
a systematic starting point for analysing the case i.e. of having a clear theoretical framework, which
I apply to the empirical data. Thus, an effort is made to answer some of the critique that could be
voiced against qualitative methods. 
An additional important critique of qualitative research is that it is hard if not impossible to replicate
(Bryman, 2012) Due to the unstructured nature of qualitative research, there are often no standard in
the data collection, which can be followed in an attempt to replicate the findings. Furthermore, the
interpretation of the data will be influenced by subjective learnings of the researcher and in the
situation  of  the  interview,  the  researcher’s  age,  gender  or  personality  might  influence  the
respondent, which then will be different if another researcher tries to replicate the study (Bryman,
2012).  Thus,  the  validity  in  field  research  steams  from  the  analysis  of  data  as  an  accurate
representation of the social world in the field – here Mozambique. Furthermore, replicability is not
a criteria, since field research is almost impossible to replicate 100% (Neuman, 2011). In the same
vein, the interviewer her/himself can also create a bias arising from expectations about the age or
race of the respondent (Neuman, 2011). It is therefore crucial to reflec on my findings as well as
what  implications  of  the  particular  interview situation  have  for  the  research  and  the  findings’
validity. 
Another limitation connected to the nature of interviews is the language barrier. Since I do not
speak Portuguese the interviews were conducted in English, which is neither my mother tongue nor
the interviewees'. The language barrier did cause challenges during two of the interviews, which
meant that I had to rephrase my questions in a simpler wording, because the interviewee simply did
not understand the question fully. In this situation I was very much aware of the potential bias such
a situation can create and I was very careful to rephrase the question in a way that it was still an
open-ended question and not “putting the words in the mouth” of the interviewee. 
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Nevertheless my appearance of a researcher from Northern Europe investigating biofuels also has
potential to influence the answers I received. Many of the persons interviewed seemed very used to
it and thus, they might have given me routine answers, because they have been interviewed many
times before “and know what the people from Europe want to hear”. However, it is very important
to note that this was not my impression, since every person interviewed took their time to answer
the questions and seem genuinely interested in giving their organisation’s perspective on the matter.
Although  this  is  my  impression  from  the  fieldwork  in  Mozambique,  the  above  mentioned
limitations should be taken into considerations of methodological limitations of this thesis.
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4. Scientific relevance
There have been a lot of discussion on PC in the EU external relations, however these discussions
have  mainly  been  limited  to  the  foreign  policy and  the  EU’s  ability  to  speak  with  one  voice
(Carbone, 2008). Thus, the focus has been on institutional or VC from a theoretical perspective.
This  thesis  will  conversely  focus  on  horizontal  and  outcome  coherence  and  how  a  potential
incoherence can have implications for the EU as a normative actor. Through out the analysis, I will
introduce and discuss the concepts of what I call discursive coherence and performed coherence.
What  lies  in  the  gap  between  the  two is  a  discrepancy of  what  the  EU claims  and  might  be
perceived  to  do  and  what  it  actually  does.  The  issue  of  policy  coherence  for  development  is
intriguing not only because the EU is the world's largest donor of ODA, but also because the EU is
a venue in which many policies are decided that affect developing countries (Carbone, 2008). Thus,
with the debate on aid effectiveness and less than a year to achieve the MDGs, which the EU has
made a  cornerstone of  its  development  policy,  it  is  pertinent  to  investigate  the degree of  PCD
exercised by the EU.
Trade  has  been  the  main  focus  as  a  policy  area,  which  can  have  great  effects  on  developing
countries, both positively and negatively. There are many reasons for this e.g. the Doha round which
has come to a halt, and the EU’s focus on Aid for Trade constitute such examples of the political
context.  Most  recently  in  academia  a  whole  special  issue  has  been  devoted  to  the  trade  and
development nexus9. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to examine other policy areas, which can have
great impacts on developing countries as is the case with the EU’s internal energy policy and the
target for biofuel in the context of climate change mitigation. The crucial importance of energy has
also been identified internationally by the UN (UN, 2013). Hence these energy initiatives reflect
why it is so important that energy policy does not undermine development policy objectives but in
turn actually facilitate the eradication of poverty. Moreover, the development of renewable energy
sources has the potential to create positive economic as well as environmental benefit  concomitant
with negative impacts on food and equity, which in turn create significant trad-offs between food,
energy and environmental goals (McCornnick, Awulachew, and Abebe, 2008). Synergies often goes
hand in hand with conflict e.g. synergy between sugarcane and energy, while conflict with food and
livelihood  (McCornnick,  Awulachew,  and  Abebe,  2008).  This  makes  it  pertinent  to  investigate
biofuels in Mozambique from a nexus perspective i.e. energy-development policy, and the nexus
perspective is also crucial for the assessment of PCD between these two policies.
9 see Contemporary Politics 2014, 20 (1)
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5. The beginning of a long cooperation – a historical overview of the 
Union’s development cooperation with third countries
The origin of European development aid goes back as far as the Union itself. When the six founding
members signed the Rome treaty in 1957, there was already a section on the ACP countries – at that
time the newly independent  colonies  of France in  particular  (Holland and Doige,  2012;  Orbie,
2012). France wished to protect its relationship with its colonial dependencies, whereas other MS
with the Netherlands and West Germany being the most the critical ones, were reluctant to involve
to Community in external affairs,  which seemed to be more French external affairs rather than
common external affairs. Nevertheless the French succeeded in the negotiations and provisions for
so-called association for all dependencies were included in the Rome Treaty.  This meant that a
contractual  treaty-based  relationship  created  the  basis  as  well  as  the  rationale  for  the  later
development  aid  that  have been arranged through the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions  and the
current Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) (Holland and Doige, 2012). Consequently, the EU
and the ACP states have enjoyed a unique contractual development partnership the last six decades
(Pape, 2013). These legally binding conctractual agreements have also been referred to by some as
a special priviledge of development assistance, trade cooperation, and political dialogue (Gomes,
2013). The foundation of the Yaoundé Convention was the recognition of the national sovereignty
of countries taking part in the agreement. It included preferential trade arrangements between the
European Community and 18 – primarily francophone – countries. The Yaoundé Convention had
three  unique  characteristics  for  the  time.  It  was  a  multilateral  framework,  it  comprised  joint
institutions  and  it  had  a  comprehensive  character.  Hence,  the  Convention  gathered  a  range  of
separate development policies under a single integrated framework. and was the first example of a
common contractual basis for the relations between the industrialised world and the developing
world  covering  technical  assistance,  trade  preferences,  financial  aid  as  well  as  investment  and
capital movements (Holland and Doige, 2012).
5.1. The current landscape of development aid
The adoption of the MDGs by 189 members of the UN put a global focus on poverty reduction
(Pape, 2013) and the UN Millennium Declaration underlined PCD as a means to achieve the MDGs
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2012). In May 2012 a new approach to development was adopted by the
EU. This was done in a context of the rapidly changing global environment and aimed at achieving
a greater impact of EU aid. This policy document is Agenda for Change. (Pape, 2013). 
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Today the CPA is the centrepiece of the EU’s development policy towards the ACP countries. It
differs significantly from its predecessors that focused on preferential trade-aid programmes, which
were applicable to the ACP states uniformly. Conversely, the CPA has three explicit goals i.e. trade
liberalisation,  regional  and  economic  differentiation,  and  political  conditionality  –  respect  for
human rights, democratic principles as well  as the rule of law are all  essential  elements of the
cooperation (Dinan, 2010). EU is promoting regional integration under the assumption that what
has  been  good  for  Europe  must  also  be  good  for  other  regions  in  the  world  (Dinan,  2010).
Moreover, the differentiation applies both geographically and economically, the latter on the basis
of a country’s level of development and ability to withstand global competition. This is why the EU
has engaged in EPAs with different ACP countries. In the wake of the EPAs, which were contested
by some NGOs and ACP countries, the EU launched its Strategy for Africa in 2005, which had the
intention of developing a comprehensive,  integrated,  and long-term framework for the relations
between the Union and the African continent (Dinan, 2010). Reduction of poverty and its eventual
eradication consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the integration of the ACP
countries into the global economy is the key objective (Gomes, 2013). 
The EU and its member states are collectively the biggest donor of development aid in the world
(Carbone 2008; Dinan, 2010). However it is important to note that some countries contribute more
than the EU itself (Carbone, 2007; Dinan, 2010). The Lisbon Treaty made development policy an
area of shared competence, which means that the EU can carry out activities as well as conduct a
common  policy  but  that  this  should  not  prevent  the  member  states  of  exercising  their  own
competence10 (Dinan, 2010). 
5.2. Legitimacy of development policy channelled through the EU
Criticisms of EU development assistance have emphasised the lack of unity in EU ODA. It has
often been articulated that the nature of EU aid is 28 +1 (after the accession of Croatia in July
2013), implying that the Commission is only filling the gaps or simply duplicating the actions of the
member states (Holland and Doige 2012). 
10 TFEU art. 2 (2) ”When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member 
States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding 
acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has
not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the 
extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence”
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Conversely, the Commission itself sees its role as exactly the body, which ensure a coherent and
efficient approach between the different actors and development policies, and thus its role is crucial
in the coordination of the medley of development cooperation and is not just an appendix to the
development assistance of the MS (Holland and Doige 2012, EC, 2011). Along these lines others
have argued for the comparative advantage of the EU in the development field due its  relative
economic and political neutrality, the greater geographical spread of aid, the ability to marshal great
amounts  of  financial  assistance  (compared  with  each  individual  MS)  as  well  as  the  long-term
security and predictability ensured by the legal  framework of  the  Lomé Conventions  and CPA
(Holland and Doige, 2012).
The principles of complementarity, coordination, and coherence were given legal recognition in the
Maastricht Treaty and the following Amsterdam Treaty added consistency to the list, thus Legally
PCD was introduced in the Maatricht Treaty and it was further strenghed with the Lisbon Treaty
(Carbone 2008; Holland and Doige, 2012). These principles have been framed as the “Four Cs” and
their introduction during the 1990s must be seen as a response to the acknowledgement that the
exisisting policy framework for the EU’s development assistance had been inadequate to solve the
challenges meet by third countries and promises made by the Union (Holland and Doige, 2012).
During the years, the EU development policy also became more political. By the beginning of the
1990s with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and Lomé IV respectively in 1993 and 1990, the
former gave development cooperation a legal basis with the treaty framework confirming a shift
towards a more political dimension. The latter introduced the promotion of democratic principles,
the rule of law, and human rights as part of the preferitial trade agreements (Gomes, 2013) . This
move towards subordinating development cooperation to trade and political interests was further
strengened with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and the introduction of the HR.
The EU has since regarded the reduction of poverty and the promotion of human rights, democracy,
and peace and security as different sides of the same coin (Gomes, 2013).
5.2.1. Coherence
Since coherence is the focus of this thesis and due to space constraints, I will only discuss the
coherence part of the “Four Cs”. 
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The principle of coherence was introduced to ensure that every area of EU policy-making were to
be compatible with the EU’s development objectives (Holland and Doige, 2012). Notwithstanding
these ambitious commitments of the “Four Cs” and in particular the principle of coherence, it is not
merely the external  policies,  which can show obstructive  to  development  objectives  by having
competing or contradictory objectives. The internal polices connected to the internal market can
also produce unintended consequences for third countries. Whether or not the EU’s internal policy-
making have unanticipated consequences, which compete or undermine development objectives,
there are clear trade-off to be dealt with in such situations, which was also discussed above in the
section on theoretical framework for policy coherence.
5.3. Conditionality and the transfer of norms
The EU has based it development assistance on conditionality – both political and economic. This
means that the recipient countries must adhere to a set of principles and/or show some progress
towards achieving a society underpinned by these principles. Central to them is that they constitute
the  core  of  the  European idea  of  itself  insofar  the  Union is  built  on  them.  The principles  are
materialised  in  a  set  of  dichotomies  such  as  internal/external  supervision,  political/economic
aspects, and positive/negative applications (Holland and Doige, 2012).
The so-called London Report from 1980 articulated for the first time that the EU should become an
international actor that shaped international events and not only responded to them (Holland and
Doige, 2012). The Lisbon Treaty can be seen as a clear follow up on this objective by calling for the
EU to act in a normative way. Thus, art. 21 TEU “The Union’s action on the international scene
shall  be  guided  by  the  principles  which  have  inspired  its  own  creation,  development  and
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the
universality and indivisibility of human rights (…)” as well as art. 3 (5) TEU: “In its relations with
the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the
protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the
Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and
the protection of human rights (…)”. 
In the Union’s relations with the world, there is thus a strong focus promotion of certain norms and
values hence underlying this, take active part in and shaping the world outside of the EU’s territory. 
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But what happens if the Union itself through the effects of its internal policies foster infringement
of these principles of conditionality e.g. breaking the rule of law, contradicts good governance, and
violating human rights? Then the lack of coherence not only undermines the development policy
objectives but more severely it is obstructing the to foundational ideas on which the EU is based on
and can raise serious concern about the legitimacy of the Union. For the purpose of this thesis, I will
focus on political conditionality. This form of conditionality gives incentives for the execution of
policies in the recipient country that promotes goals of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and
good governance, or the mere expectation of the latter, by rewarding preferential trade agreements,
aid or other types of financial assistance (Holland and Doige, 2012). Since the list on conditionality
include many aspects I will only focus on good governance due to limited space.
5.3.1. Good governance
The notion of good governance was introduced in tandem with the other concepts of human rights,
democracy, and rule of law in the development discourse in the 1990s and due to the influence of
the EP, good governance has been mandatory in all  types of agreements with third countries –
developing as well as developed. Ultimately, it implies a broad and inclusive idea encompassing all
aspects of the management of public affairs emphasising transparent, accountable, participatory, and
equitable  governance.  Hence,  good governance  is  based  on democratic  principles  connected  to
efficient and competent institutions (Holland and Doige, 2012). Although governance is not part of
the essential elements in the CPA, it is categorised as a fundamental element and included in the
criteria,  which the ACP countries must fulfill to be eligible to and have access to development
assistance (Gomes, 2013).
Usually the literature discusses the transfer of norms and the EU as a normative actor. Subsequently,
it becomes pertinent to examine this normative character in relation the ACP countries. Thus, the
EU’s mandate to uphold and promote its values and interests has a central place for the chracter of
the EU, and thus values play a significant role for the EU’s relations with the ACP group (Pape,
2013).  Forsberg  (2011)  for  instance  suggests  different  features  of  normative  power;  normative
identity,  normative  interests,  normative  behaviour,  normative  means  of  power  and  normative
outcome. Relating these to EU development policy, the normative identity and normative means of
power are interesting, in particular concerning conditionality, where the EU has a set of principles
the recipient ACP countries must follow, such as good governance as mentioned above. However
regarding conditionality,  critics  also argue that  the EU employs  double standards (Holland and
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Doige, 2012). Not only is it hard to measure such a broad notion as good governance, it can also be
hard to determine, when a breach of the rule of law or violations have been sufficiently severe to
sanction a country. Moreover, if the sanctions have consequences for European jobs, the political
costs  are  higher  than  if  such  sanctions  were  placed  on  a  country  with  which  the  EU  has  a
neglectable trade.  An example of a clear double standard exactly concerning the norm of good
governance was prevailing in the CPA. In the 2010 revision of the CPA, article 9 was amended so
that the principles underlying good governance apply equally to the ACP and EU MS (Gomes,
2013). Hence the EU wanted to transfer the norm of good governance to the ACP countries through
aid conditionality but it did not had a legal obligation to follow this very norm itself. This is an
obvious lack of good governance from the EU and what I would argue “bad” governance, since the
EU is acting as a normative actor towards the ACP countries by promoting certain values without
acting as a good exemple itself. Strinkingly, the EU did not until the revision in 2010 make this
obligation of good governance equally applicaple to the Union itself in its relations to the ACP
countries. This lack of coherence contributes to the gap between the Union’s ambition to be an
important international actor and its performance and perceived capabilities (Holland and Doige,
2012). Ultimately, this creates incoherence, which can be destructive to the legitimacy of the EU’s
development policy and the image of the Union as a whole.  If the policies promoted internally in
the EU e.g. the energy policy then foster breaches of the rule of law and consequently undermines
good governance in the recipient countries, the effectiveness of the Union’s development policy cen
be questioned. If one hand takes, what the other gives, discussions of aid effectiveness become
meaningless and more seriously EU’s legitimacy as an international actor is undermined.
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6. The foundation for EU’s energy policy
Now turning to the energy policy, this area has been very important during the formation of the EU.
In the very beginning of the European integration process energy played a prominent role qua the
idea behind the Union was a coal and steel community (ECSC) with the Paris Treaty of 1951.
Hence energy policy was initially at the forefront of the European integration by having two of the
original European Communities (ECSC and EURATOM) dealing with the provision of energy to
the  European  economy (Dinan,  2010).  Although  the  ECSC expired  in  2002  and  subsequently
treaties have broadening the community to the Union we know today with the Lisbon Treaty as the
legal foundation, energy still remains important (Buchan, 2010). 
6.1. The nature of energy policy
The EU is highly depended on import for its energy use. More than 50% the supplies come from
imports,  mainly  originating  from  Russia,  the  Middle  East,  and  North  Africa  (Dinan,  2010).
Consequently, energy policy has been put on top of the EU’s agenda due to rising oil prices, fears of
cut-offs from Russian gas supplies, and energy-driven climate change. Parallely liberalisation of the
energy market has been push forward by the Commission harder than ever before, although this
topic has remained prominent on the energy agenda the last twenty years (Buchan, 2010; Dinan
2010).  Energy  security  is  connected  to  the  CFSP,  while  climate  change  connects  energy  and
environmental  concerns  (Buchan,  2010).  Following  this,  energy security  is  defined  as  “having
adequate access to energy at reasonable prices” (Buchan, 2010). This has become a salient issue
with the accession of the central and eastern European countries. Following this, the EU’s interest in
the promotion of biofuels is inter alia connected to the increased preoccupation of energy security
within the Union (Afionis and Stringer, 2012). The identification of biofuels as a key energy source
for the future is spurred by two different developments. Firstly, the EU transport sector relied almost
entirely on oil, making the EU dependent on external oil sources. Secondly, in regards the to Kyoto
Protocol (KP) the EU was not performing well  in order to meet its  reduction target of 8% for
greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  emissions.  Failing  to  meet  its  Kyoto  target,  the  EU  would  not  only
undermine its  attempted leadership within the international  climate scene,  it  would also negate
progress in other environmental areas for the EU (Afionis and Stringer, 2012). Meanwhile, the EU’s
ambitious goals on climate change are transforming most aspects of the energy policy, since energy
use accounts for approximately two-thirds of the total GHG (Buchan, 2010). 
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Only until  recently energy got its own chapter in the treaty and hence previously there was no
separate and specific articles on energy policy. During the years policy-makers therefore borrowed
legal competence from either environmental or economic parts of the treaties to justify proposals for
energy measures (Buchan, 2010). A chapter of environment was added with the SEA and thus a
legal competence for environment was in place (Dinan, 2010; Falkner, 2011; Wallace et al., 2010).
Moreover a specific article on environmental protection was added with the SEA (Dinan, 2010).
The SEA and the following development of the single market were important steps towards the
recognition of energy’s economic importance, and with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992/3 the EU
gained competence  to  improve the  cross-border  energy infrastructure  as  well  as  increasing  the
Union’s  ability  to  act  on  environmental  issues  (Buchan,  2010).  Ultimately,  the  energy  policy
received its own chapter with the Lisbon Treaty and the union now has legal competence in this
policy area. However, there still remains a lot in the hands of MS, since art. 194(2) gives them the
right  to  “(…)  determine  the  conditions  for  exploiting  its  energy resources,  its  choice  between
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply (…)”. The energy policy has
four  overarching objectives,  which  are  to  ensure  the  function  of  the  energy market,  to  ensure
security  of  energy supply in  the  Union,  to  promote  energy efficiency,  energy saving,  and  the
development  of  new  and  renewable  energy  forms,  to  promote  the  interconnection  of  energy
networks.
6.1.2. The climate-energy nexus – the complex interplay of two policies
As described by Buchan (2010) energy’s  significant  contribution to  GHG emissions  has  major
implications  for  the  internal  energy  policy  in  the  EU  and  makes  it  inherently  connected  to
environmental concerns and climate policy11. Thus, the complex interactions and implications of
one policy on another, makes a strong case for PC. However, this interaction between different
policies can also derogate the climate change policies if PC and environmental policy integration
are not exerted to a certain degree and considerations towards energy and agricultural industries are
regarded as more important than environmental considerations. 
11 Meanwhile, climate change policies can potentially also affect agricultural policy, transportation
policy and even health policies, since emission reductions can be connected to cleaner air and in
general less pollution of water, air etc.
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However, the emphasis on the importance of environmental protection is stated in TFEU art. 11
“[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation
of  the  Union  policies  and  activities,  in  particular  with  a  view  to  promoting  sustainable
development”. Thus, the safeguarding of the environment as a high priority should be expected with
this enshrinement in the Treaty. Moreover one of the main objectives in the environmental policy is
the combat against climate change as stated in TFEU art. 191 “promoting measures at international
level  to  deal  with regional  or  worldwide  environmental  problems,  and in  particular  combating
climate change”. Furthermore, the environmental policy is based upon the precautionary principle
(TFEU art. 191, 2), and hence thereby calls for action even though there is not a 100% scientific
agreement on an issue.
6.1.3. The 20-20-20 targets and the importance of biofuels
The  20-20-20  targets include 20% reduction of GHGs, a 20% share of renewable energy in the
energy mix and 20% energy efficiency – all targets to be achieved by 2020. To support these targets
endorsed by the European Council in 2007, the Climate and Energy Package was finally adopted in
2009 by the Council (EC, 2014). When it comes to the target of a 20% share of renewable sources
in the energy mix, which is the target this theis focuses on, more specifically a share of 10% in the
transport sector should come from renewable sources and thus, the question of biofuels becomes
relevant. In connection to this target, the RED was adopted in 2009. More recently on October 17th
2012, the Commission made a proposal to a new directive amending directive 98/70/EC relating to
the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending RED. This proposal is made on the basis of
scientific evidence that the 1st generation biofuels might not be capable of contributing to actual
CO2 reductions due to indirect land-use change (ILUC) (EC, 2012a).
The new proposal, from the Commission has at its core the aim to include ILUC, since conversion
of land into agricultural land for biofuel cultivation can lead to an indirect rise in emissions and
thereby reduce the actual emission savings12. Therefore biofuels have a potential risk to not attain
GHG reductions, but rather when including ILUC, these can “negate some or all of the greenhouse
gas savings of individual biofuels relative to the fossil fuels they replace.” (EC 2012b).
12 I will return to the issue of indirect land-use changes and biofuels in the section “The Renewable
Energy Directive – friend or foe for sustainable development”
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Furthermore, the Commission does not wish to support biofuels with subsidies, which by the year
2020 “do not lead to substantial greenhouse gas savings (when emissions from indirect land-use
change are included) and are produced from crops used for food and feed.” (EC, 2012b.) However,
at the same time the Commission ensures to respect the “existing investments made in biofuels
production” (EC, 2012b).
6.2. Integration of climate as a cross-cutting issue
EU policy-makers see themselves as pioneers in the area of mitigation climate change. Especially in
the development of international and regional measures to combat climate change by playing a
leading role in the negotiations of the KP (Buchan, 2010). Hence the EU has become a global leader
in  international  climate  policy-making  (Dinan,  2010;  Kelemen,  2010;  Brandi,  2012).  The
international ambitions have lead to bold internal targets, which in turn have great implications for
the Union’s  energy policy,  since energy production  contributes  significantly to  GHG emissions
(Buchan,  2010).  Thereby,  due  to  the  concerns  of  climate  change,  the  energy policy  has  been
extensively influenced by environmental concerns, which have been incorporated into the energy
policy.  Environmental  and  energy  policy  have  also  seen  an  increasing  interlinkage,  which  is
reflected  by the  parallel  development  of  EU’s  climate  and energy strategies  (Dinan,  2010).  In
general the Commission has tried to include environmental policy in other policies and in particular
made it an integral part of transport, energy, and agricultural policies (Dinan, 2010). 
To sum up this section on energy policy, it has become clear that internally within the Union, energy
is connected to and influenced by other policy areas – in particular environment historically and but
recently also climate change. The importance of energy policy is underlined by its long story in
European integration being the foundation of the collaboration with the creation of the Community
with the Paris Treaty and the following Rome Treaty establishing the path for integration. The issue
of  energy  policy’s  interplay  with  climate  policy  is  reflected  by  the  20-20-20  targets and  the
subsequently target of 10% biofuels within the transport sector. All these streams of connection lead
to the nexus of energy and development policy, which will be discussed in the next section with
Mozambique as a case study for the EU’s interaction in a ACP country. 
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7. Context of biofuels
There is a “triple win” assumption behind biofuels. It is founded on the belief that biofuels will
reduce GHG, and thus is connected to the combat against climate change and addresses a current
pressing environmental problem. Secondly, it is assumed that biofuels will foster economic growth
and  development  in  the  Global  South  by  promoting  employment  and  livelihoods  and  thus
contributing  to  rural  development  (Borras,  Fig,  and  Suárez,  2011).  All  this,  concomitant  with
achieving energy security and become independent from fossil fuels from unstable or politically
hostile countries. This energy security can in turn maintain the current economic production and
consumption in the Global North (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011). Shifts in policies have directed
the global interest in biofuels. Nevertheless, concerns about biofuels’ effect on global food security
have been raised as there was a biofuel boom in the EU driven by e.g. subsidies in Germany and
mandatory requirements of minimum shares of biofuel in the energy mix at the same time as a
dramatic rise with sky rocking food prices (Dinan, 2010).
7.1. Mozambique – an overview of the political economy of the country
Mozambique is a former Portuguese colony in the south eastern part of Africa and has a population
of about 23 million, whereas approximately 70% live in rural areas (EC, 2007; World Bank, 2012).
Mozambique ranks as second-lowest on the Human Development Index (HDI) being number 185
only surpassed by Niger and Democratic Republic of the Congo, which both share the last place in
the HDI (UNDP, 2013). It is classified as a low-income country and had a Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita of US$ 441 in 2010, signicficant lower than the average of US$ 510 for other low
income countries (World Bank, 2012). In Mozambique around 80% of the population is employed
by agriculture, however the sector only comprises around 25% of the Mozambican GDP and 16%
of exports. The sector is mainly small-holder farming, and agribusiness is only found on 3% of the
total  area  of  cultivated  land,  which  shows the  little  diffusion of  commercial  agriculture  in  the
country (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011). Around 54% of the Mozambican population live below the
poverty line. (EC, 2007) and the country remain one of the pooest in the world (Schut, Slingerland,
& Locke, 2010). This is despite a relative strong economic growth since 1995 with a 10-12% grow
in the late 90s, albeit it has slowed down to around 7% the last years due to the global food, fuel,
and financial crisis since 2008 (World Bank, 2012). Mozambique is a net importer of food and fuel
and the international food crisis in 2008 had great negative effects on the conuntry (World Bank,
2011). 
33
During the last  decade Mozambique has experienced a strong turn to natural resources but this
development has not transformed the economy and neither has the economic growth benefitted the
poor. Conversely, there has been an increase in the already great disparities in the wealth (Buur,
2014). Moreover the distribution of poverty is centred in rural areas and in the northern part of the
country. Therefore, a main challenge for Mozambique is to diversify the source of economic growth
and to develop the agricultural sector, which remain subsistence-based and largely unproductive
(World Bank, 2012). 
7.2. Biofuels in Mozambique and legal and political context
The recent search for land has been called the global land rush lands (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011)
and since 2004 there has been a sustained interest in the development of biofuels in Mozambique
(ODI,  2013).  This  interest  has  been  based  on  a  hope  to  improve  energy  security,  promote
agrucultural development, stimulate exports, and attracting foreign capital, while at the same time
reducing poverty (Di Lucia, 2010). Mozambique is considered to have one of the largest biofuels
production potentials  in  Africa (IIED, 2010).  This  has also stimulated the surge for biofuels  in
Mozambique and makes the country particular relevant for the nexus of development and energy.
The majority of these projects have had the EU targeted as a specific market and the initial interest
in development opportunities has been high from both foreign and domestic investors. Nevertheless,
the has been a decline in  interest  during the last  few years,  which has been caused by several
internal and external factors such as political and bureaucratic delays in acquiring land use licenses
and  the  global  financial  situation  (ODI,  2013).  In  2010  48  running  projects  on  biofuels  were
registered but as of 2013 only 18 were still operating. Reasons for the discontinuation of so many
projects can be atributed to either a revoke of land use rights or simply just ceased operating due to
other  factors  (ODI,  2013).  In  2009  the  Mozambican  government  approved  a  new  Policy  and
Strategy for Biofuels. There are three objectives underlying this policy; development of the energy
sector, enhance energy security, and reduce imports of oil. According to the policy and strategy, the
biofuel sector will be developed in three stages, where the first one – the pilot phase – will continue
until 2015. The second phase span from 2015-2020, which is an operational period, and the third
phase focus on the expansion and runs from 2020 onwards (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011). 
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Mozambique is claimed to have one of the most progressive land laws in the region, which is able
to protect the rights of the local people's lands (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011). The law from 1997
is one of the few laws in the world, which is very clear with the aim of protecting as well as
promoting the interest of poor, rural people lands (Borras, Fig, & Suárez, 2011). The law’s art. 12
asserts that no community or household land can be taken away without any prior consultation with
as well  as consent by the affected people.  Thus,  there is on paper a strong legal foundation to
protect  local  communities  in  Mozambique  against  so-called  land  grabbing.  However  cases  of
relocation and dispossession of people in connection to the establishment of nature reserves have
proved that the law is no silver bullet (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011). Furthermore, in the case of
Procana13 the consultation of the local communities was limited to the terms of the relocation of the
people and not whether they actually accepted the biofuel project on their land. Additionally, it was
only the local elites and elders who were consulted and endorsed the mega-project but discussion
with individuals  from the different  communities  have  indicated that  the  endorsement  also only
concerned the relocation lands (Borras, Fig and Suárez, 2011). This therefore begs the question of
what kind of consultation is being conducted and raises concerns about the qualitative aspects of the
land law and the consultation process in land acquisitions in Mozambique. 
7.3. Mozambique – a prime destination for biofuel cultivation
In the wake of the aforementioned global land rush, there has been a special interest in large-scale
industrial  sugar  cane  plantations  in  especially  Africa  based  on  the  assumption  that  there  is  a
sufficient  supply of  available,  appropriate  land in  that  region  (Borras,  Fig,  and Suárez,  2011).
Consequently, there have been widespread reports of displaced local, rural communities as well as
corruption in the land deals. Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank have as a response to
this advocated principles of responsible agricultural investments. However, criticisms from the UN
Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food have remained, arguing that these principles might even
further facilitate the so-called land grabbing (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011). Mozambique fits very
well to the drivers of biofuel production. It is fairly unpopulated, has good climatic conditions, and
with the abundance of land, there is a great potential to use under-utilised land without displacing or
disrupting the livelihood of local  communities (Borras,  Fig,  & Suárez,  2011; CEPAGRI 2014).
Consequently, great optimism has flourished around the development of biofuels in Mozambique
since 2010 (Borras, Fig, and Suárez 2011). 
13 A biofuel project with international investors. The case of ProCana will be discussed further 
below
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Addiontionally the electricity dispersion in the country is very low. Around 65% of the country does
not have electricity. However, this is a national aggregated number and in rural areas only about 7%
has electricity. In some places only 3% has acces to energy – for instance in the region Zambezia
(EC n.d). The direction of the energy production towards international markets and neighbouring
countries is not a new trend in Mozambique. The country has several sources of energy such as
coal, natural gas, and hydropower. Meanwhile the trend in the Mozambican energy policy has been
to export the majority of the energy produced domestically, leaving the majority of the country’s
inhabitants without electricity (Borras, Fig, & Suárez, 2011). Therefore it is pertinent to ask if this
would change with the production of biofuels?
7.4. The reality of jatropha as a biofuel crop
The local seed jatropha has been promoted and given the promise of being non-irrigated, due to its
resilience and ability to grow in semi-dry areas. While jatropha can survive on dry lands, it cannot
be commercially productive without irrigation and fertiliser (Borras, Fig, & Suárez, 2011). This
truth has many foreign companies realised since (PetroMoc, 2014). Thus, jatropha needs water and
fertiliser to become a commercially viable crop for biofuels. This has also been the case for many
other countries such as Kenya, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011).
This  implies  that  water  also  becomes  a  crucial  part  of  the  biofuel  puzzle  in  Mozambique and
elsewhere. In the case of ProCana and the production of sugar cane for ehtanol, the company was
issued a guarantee from the government to use up to 750 million cubic meters a year. A later study
showed  that  if  ProCana  were  to  use  all  the  water  from the  dam,  which  was  allocated  to  the
company,  if  would  have  severe  consequences  for  the  water-user  downstream.  This  means  that
small-scale  farmers  and livestock herders  would  face  water  shortage  (Borras,  Fig,  and Suárez,
2011). The discussion about biofuels threatening livelihoods of local people then also becomes a
question about water resources and not only land. With the allocation of water from the local dam to
the ProCana sugar cane plantations, the capacity of the local communities to produce food for their
own consumption would be undermined and puts into question their livelihoods (Borras, Fig, and
Suárez, 2011). This implies a clear spill over in the complex context of biofuel production in the
Global  South  and  it  contests  the  assumption  and  expectation  that  biofuels  in  countries  like
Mozambique will  not pose a threat to  local  communities’ existing livelihood but instead create
employment and rural development for the benefit of the local people. 
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In the same vein, a study conducted in 2009 (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011) interviewed a local
older man, who lived on the land that had been allocated to ProCana. Interestingly, he pointed out
that he was perfectly satisfied with his  life and happy being a subsistence farmer and charcoal
producer in his local community. Furthermore, he also expected that it would be the younger and
more skilled men, who would be hired by ProCana to work in the plantations. This raises questions
of the legitimacy of the perceived benefits for local communities of biofuel production. Apart from
this  difference in  the perception of  what  is  a  good life  and what  local  communities  aspire  for
(however young people or other people in the community might not agree with the interviewed
elder), job opportunities might not occur in the number and extent that companies and governments
have planed or wished for. In the case of Procana the number of people employed would depend on
national legislation on labour and social safety regulations, thus with weaker regulations, ProCana
would choose labour-intensive and non-mechanised production, where as with a stricter regulation
it is plausible that the company would chose mechanisation of the plantations, thus not employing
as many as initially envisioned lands (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011). This phenomenon can be
categorised as Li’s idea (2011) about non-labour land acquisitions, which is a need for poor people’s
land but not their labour. This happens when companies come to developing countries and get large-
scale  land deals  but  do  not  employ the  local  people  living  on the  land  allocated,  because  the
dispossessed people simply cannot be absorbed in any of the economically productive sectors of the
country’s economy.
7.5. The case of ProCana in Mozambique – a peculiar case yet encompassing the issues 
connected to biofuels 
The  case  of  ProCana  in  Mozambique  is  very  peculiar  compared  to  other  biofuel  projects  in
Mozambique14.  Nevertheless,  the nature of the land acquisitions and the project process remain
similar to other biofuel projects in Mozambique, since it encompasses many issues connected to
biofuel production in developing countries it is apt toinclude for an understanding of the biofuel
landscape in Mozambique15(Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011). 
14 A lot of serious accusations of the main investor behind ProCana, Muller Conrad Rautenbach
have been raised due to his close connection to contested regimes in Zimbabwe and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. For more details see (Borras, Fig, & Suárez, 2011).
15 Meanwhile in October 2009 ProCana announced the closure of its project due to a focus on
mining, which is the main area in its portfolio.  Subsequently,  the Mozambican government has
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Marginal  land is  defined as  unused,  under-utilised,  idle  lands  or  waste  lands  (Borras,  Fig,  and
Suárez, 2011). Underlying the assumption of marginal land is that it is assumed that they are empty
or inhabited by anyone and that they are not fully utilised in economic terms lands (Borras, Fig, and
Suárez, 2011). But these lands do usually have a use e.g. pastureland, village common or used to
gather  nuts  and  honey.  Mean  while  these  types  of  land-uses  are  not  officially  recognised
Euobserver, 2009), which is why these lands are considered unused. On the land, which ProCana
was  allocated,  there  were  activities  of  subsistence  farming,  charcoal  production,  and  livestock
raising  in  the  form  of  cattle  herders  lands.  The  ProCane  land  was  also  placed  on  a  “prime
agricultural land with great potential for food production” (Borras, Fig, and Suárez, 2011:222). It
can therefore not be excluded that other biofuel investors have been allocated land similar to the
situation of the Procana project. The wish of producing biofuels for the national market as well
international  energy  markets  was  also  confirmed  by  interviews  with  representatives  from  the
Ministry  of  Energy as  well  as  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  which  were  conducted  during  my
fieldwork  in  Mozambique.  The  ProCana  biofuel  project  was  directed  to  export  80%  of  the
production to the South African Development Community (SADC), although mainly South Africa,
and thus no significant amount of the biofuels was envisioned to ameliorate the energy poverty in
the rural areas of Mozambique. The interviews I conducted also confirmed this. At the moment the
intention is to develop a biofuel production for exports (Ministry of Energy,  2014; CEPAGRI,
2014). Here the EU is seen as a key end market. The reason why the biofuels is not directed toward
the national Mozambican market is that the latter is not developed enough and thus a biofuel sector
targeted the national level is not yet profitable. However, in time when the national market has
developed,  the  biofuels  should  figure  as  an  important  energy  source  of  local  consumption.
Interestingly, a NGO representative interviewed disputed this claim with the example of the cotton
sector  in  Mozambique.  Cotton has  long been important  in  the  country and is  a  cash crop like
jatropha, sugar cane and other crops used in biofuel production. The local farmers cultivating cotton
have not benefitted from being employed in the cotton sector, since the price of cotton is under
pressure and constantly decreasing on the international market. He did not see why the case of
biofuel  should  be  any different.  Cotton  remained  to  be  sold  and  exported  to  the  international
market,  so why should  biofuels  turn  into  a  different  direction  – especially  with  the  increasing
demand for biofuels (WE Effect, 2014). 
announced that  it  is  looking for  new investors  to  develop to  30 ha  land that  was allocated  to
ProCana. For more details see Borras, Fig, & Suárez, 2011.
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A study commissioned by the Swedish Embassy in Maputo also suggests that the growing of cash
crops (tabacco and cotton) in the northern rural areas has mainly benefitted larger producers and
thus, contributed further to disparities in wealth (Tvedten et al. 2013).
7.6. EU - a partner facilitating or distorting development?
In the context of Mozambique there has been a surge of land requests especially following the years
2008-2010. These have in particular been made by European companies, which wanted to take
advantage of Mozambique’s vast natural resources in order to produce biofuels (CEPAGRI, 2014;
IIED, 2013).  In  total  145.  HA of  land have  been allocated to  these request  (IIED, 2013).  The
incentive for land acquisitions in Mozambique must be seen in the light of the internal policies of
the EU with the climate objectives and the following energy policies committing the Union to have
a  20% share  of  renewable  energy in  the  energy mix  with  a  specific  target  for  biofuels  in  the
transport sector as previously discussed. 
Despite  Mozambique’s  vast  and fairly  unexploited  resources,  the  country is  also  attracting  for
investors due to a favourable climate for biofuel crop cultivation and low labour costs (Ministry of
Energy,  2014).  The incentives from the national government to support the development of the
biofuel sector are two-folded. Firstly, Mozambique faced increasing energy import expenditures due
the rising oil prices around 2008, and the government therefore sees biofuels as a viable energy
resource that can make Mozambique less dependent on oil imports. Furthermore biofuels are seen
as key to rural development and an important contributor to economic development. Secondly, the
prospect of exporting to the European market is a crucial factor (Ministry of Energy, 2014). With
the progressive land law, Mozambique appears on paper to be an optimal ACP country where the
business-development nexus can be unfolded as aforementioned. In the wake of the surge of land
acquisitions, the Mozambican government started to heavily distribute jatropha seeds to farmers in
local communities. If local farmers would grow this crop, they would be able to deliver to the
conversion plant and hence be part of the production supply chain, giving them an important source
of  income (CEPAGRI,  2014).  This  approach of  creating  a  livelihood for  poor  communities  by
integrating them in the economy goes hand in hand with the concept of “green inclusive growth”,
which is central in the EU’s development policy. ODA is deemed more efficient if it deals with the
causes and not the effects of poverty as the Commission Green Paper asserts, “aid (…) must tackle
the roots of poverty rather than its symptoms” (EC, 2010).
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The development in Mozambique therefore seemed very promising by the year 2010. Meanwhile,
there has also been raised issues from NGOs in regards to food security and land grabbing, which
has been related to the production of biofuels in other developing countries. Conversely,  biofuels'
impact  on  food security  does  not  differ  signicficantly compared  to  other  agro-industrial  crops.
Following this, the way the land is made available and the models of production may be more
important in avoiding negative outcomes of biofuel production (ODI, 2014). Furthermore, issues
have been raised about the actual socio-economic benefits  for local communities,  since biofuel
production may result in poor or even exacerbated labour conditions in developing countries in
particular (Di Lucia, 2010; Afionis and Stringer, 2012). If the EU’s energy policy is contributing to
“bad” governance and disregard of local communities land rights, there is not only a lack of HC
between the EU’s external and internal policies. But this lack of coherence also questions the EU’s
legitimacy and its discourse of development cooperation as a partnership with the recipient country.
The language and discourse of inter alia the CPA (Cotonou  Partnership agreement) confirms the
partnership discourse.
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8. The Renewable Energy Directive – friend or foe for sustainable 
development
The RED from 2009 with the target that renewable energy in the transport sector should be at least
10% the final consumption by 2020 is part of the EU Climate and Energy Package from 2008 and is
embedded within the context of climate change (Nilsson et al., 2012). However, the sub-objective
of renewable energy in the transport  sector is not specific about the type of primary renewable
energy and concerns all types of transport technology. Thus, it is neutral and does therefore not
emphasis biofuels. However, the RED builds on the previous biofuel directive, and it is clear that
there is an intention to promote biofuels in road transportation for the purpose of climate change
mitigation This makes the interaction between the promotion of biofuels and the RED strong in
practice, despite that the sub-objective is neutral about the type of primary renewable energy source
(Nilsson et al., 2012). It is therefore pertinent to examine the concequences of EU biofuel policy in
Mozambique in relation to PCD and the nexus of development and energy.
8.1. ILUC and biofuels as a means to mitigate climate change
Increased use of biofuels will  cause direct as well  as indirect land-use changes (Nilsson et  al.,
2012). This has also been considered in the RED directive and a set of sustainability criteria have
been developed, which can be seen as a  first  step in  defining a more environmentally friendly
biomass production with the aim to prevent potentially negative interactions (Nilsson et al., 2012).
Even though it still remains hard to assess the final policy outcomes concerning direct and indirect
land-use changes globally (UNEP, 2009),  there is  on the other  hand little  doubt  about  that  the
increases in agricultural biomass production on the global scale are likely to increase the current
pressure for land conversion of forests and grasslands – also partly driven by EU biofuel policies
(WBGU, 2008). ILUC occur when fertile land, which normally is being used for growing food
crops, is being replaced by biofuel crops. This can lead to land being clear for food production
elsewhere in the world to meet the demand for food crops. Thus, through ILUC biofuels can lead to
increased GHG emissions, higher food prices, and loss of biodversity (Tilman et al. 2009). The
environmental  impacts  of  biofuels  can  therefore  be  high,  if  biofuels  are  not  managed  by  a
comprehensive policy framework that takes into account the whole lifecycle of biofuels as well as
social aspects such as food security. To assess the sustainability of biofuels is therefore crucial. 
41
In  the  same  vein,  prioritising  between  the  three  dimensions  of  sustainability,  that  is  social,
environmental and economic, is like asking to prioritise between water, air or food, where all thee
are as important for human life (Blackburn, 2007). Thus, it has been argued that the three aspects
i.e.  social,  environmental  and  economic  are  mutually  exclusive  and  equally  important,  that  is,
without  environmental  sustainability,  we cannot  have  economic  nor  social  sustainability.  Or  as
Afionis and Stringer (2012), put it,  the three sustainability dimensions are sine qua non in their
nature. 
RED represents  the  most  ambitious  attempt  to  foster  use  of  renewable  energy among  the  MS
(Afionis and Stringer, 2012). Following this, the objectives of the EU biofuel policy are ambitious
in scope and timeframe, nevertheless, ILUC effects strongly decrease the reduction of GHG and the
whole production value chain must therefore be included in the evaluation of the implications of
biofuels (Nilsson et al., 2012). This comprehensive approach to biofuel policies is also advocated
by Tilman et al. (2009), where it is suggested that biofuels should only receive policy support, when
they  make  a  positive  impact  on  four  objectives,  that  is,  energy  security,  GHG  reduction,
biodiversity,  and a  sustainable  food supply.  Conversely,  if  legislation  is  vague it  can lead to  a
development of a counterproductive biofuel industry. Thus, actually working couter to the whole
idea of biofuels – and in the context of Mozambique undermine EU's developmental objectives.
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9. Discursive coherence contra performed coherence
A great challenge for the development of a coherence analysis, especially concerning the outcomes
and impacts, is time lags, because the tracing of outcomes and impacts requires a long time scale
(Nilsson et al., 2012). Consequently, the analysis of PC also begs the question of system boundaries
e.g. geographical boundaries, because patterns of interaction in policy areas with a far-reaching
spatial dimension – e.g. Mozambique in regards to development policy – may influence the impacts
and outcomes of a given EU policy with specific targets and objectives (Nilsson et al., 2012). Thus,
both time lags and system boundaries pose challenges in the analysis of PC. Following this, it has
long been recognised that at the level of outcomes, it is a central challenge in policy analysis to
determine the effect of multiple policies (Nilsson et al., 2012). Hence for the case of biofuels in
Mozambique it is a real challenge to determine whether the EU's energy policy or its development
policy has  had certain  effect  in  Mozambique.  This  is  also  hard to  determinate,  because of  the
interplay of these policies  and how development  policy by supporting biofuels  in  the name of
achieving energy security in Mozambique, can supply the EU with the biofuels demanded by the
Union. Consequently, when governance is considered to cover not only policy, but also politics and
polity, it could be argued that a more comprehensive approached should be applied. Meanwhile,
there are scientific trade-offs arising, since a broadening of the approach would entail a great lack of
analytical clarity (Nilsson et al., 2012). By comprising multiple actors with competing interests and
ideas, the policy-making becomes a political and contested process (Nilsson et al., 2012). It is in
this context that the energy-development nexus must be viewed and consequently the analysis of
PCD in the case of biofuels in Mozambique is situated. Which interests and whose interests should
prevail?  Is  stimulation  of  economic  development  and  growth  more  important  than  rural
communities' rights to their land and traditional practices? Furthermore, should EU energy policy
take predence over develoment policy, that is, biofuels in Mozambique should be exported to the
EU for the Union's energy security and fulfilment of targets renewable energy? This export is also
providing Mozambique with  much  needed foreign  capital  and promote  economic  growth,  thus
indirect allegedly supporting development of the country. 
9.1. Addressing policy coherence for development in Mozambique 
The notions of complementarity, coordination, coherence and consistency have come to dominate
the development policy of the EU. However, there has been some mixed results and consequently
mixed success (Holland and Doige, 2012). 
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This begs the question of whether these four Cs are merely retrotrics, which in turn leads to a
discussion of the discrepancy between political statements or commitments and treaty obligations
and the actual policy conducted on the ground. In the following section, I will discuss this under the
headings  of  discursive  coherence  and  performed  coherence.  These  concepts  are  based  on  my
research and analysis in this thesis.
The EU policy documents and the treaty itself make explicit commitment to PCD as previously
discussed. However, in reality these commitments are not being implemented. An interview with
representatives from two different sections at the EU delegation in Maputo, Mozambique, revealed
that there were no detailed instruction and procedures regarding PCD and energy. The civil servants
were merely instructed to fill in a form, when entering into new projects supported by the EU but it
was there  own responsibility to  really scrutinise whether  or  not  a  certain project  would  create
incoherence  (EU  delegation,  2014).  Nevertheless  with  a  share  of  about  56%  of  the  global
consumption of biodiesel, the EU is one of the main biodiesel consumers (EC, 2013a), and thus its
demand for biofuels are crucial for countries producing this commodity. Furthermore when the EU
itself  even  talks  about  the  coherence  and  synergy  between  energy  related  matters  and  the
importance of energy for poverty reduction and sustainable development (EU n.d), it is striking that
there is not a greater focus on the relationship between energy and development on the ground in
Mozambique. Moreover, also that there is not a comprehesive framework for how to link energy
with development to facilitate reduction of poverty in the projects that the EU delegation supports.
On paper the EU will in particular work with the energy in rural area and focus on increased use of
renewable enrgy as well as efficient use of traditional biomass. The overall approach from the EU in
Energy Initiative is  a partnership with developing countries as “other stakeholder” (EU Energy
Initiative  p.  1),  and  successful  projects  within  the  EU-ACP Energy  Facility  with  25  “Energy
services  centres”  in  rural  Mozambique  is  highlighted  (EU  Energy  Initiative  p.  1).  Although
important,  these  25 showcases  of  succesful  energy projects  in  Mozambique remain  as  isolated
“classical  development  cooperation”  (my  wording),  and  a  comprehensive  approach  and  the
understanding of causal relations between internal EU policies and external ones such as energy and
development remain absent. Hence the EU’s energy policy and connected biofuel targets are not
linked to development cooperation and thus not creating synergies between the two policy areas,
which is an explicit aim of PCD. 
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The EU identifies an aspect of its biofuel policy, which can have a positive impact on developing
countries, that is, the encouragment of environmentally friendly produced biofuels (EC, 2008). This
assumption implies the aim of synergies is fulfilled. The data collection reaffirmes this concerning
the development of the national sustainability criteria for biofuels. The Ministry of Energy (2014)
emphasises  that  the  EU  sustainability  criteria  have  been  important  in  the  development  of  the
national  criteria  developed in 2009.  This  is  not  only evidence for  what  the EU identifies  as  a
synergy between the  Union’s  energy policy and development  policy,  it  also confirms  the EU’s
normative power in Mozambique. It is a Mozambican self-interest that can explain, why the country
is obeying the EU’s sustainability criteria and use them as a foundation the development of the
country’s own sustainability criteria; bluntly the country will be able to export more biofuels to the
EU – and the international market in general – if their  biofuel production comply with the EU
norms of sustainability for biofuels (Ministry of Energy, 2014). Thus, by pursuing self-interest and
perceiving the EU as a legitimate actor, Mozambique can fullfil their own national objectives and
political priorities. In connection to this and related to the discussion of the EU as a driver of norms,
the interview with the Ministry of Energy revealed a surprising idea underlying the promotion of
biofuels,  which  was  to  reduce  GHG  emissions  (Ministry  of  Energy,  2014).  Meanwhile
Mozambique’s contribution to GHG is very small with 0.1 tons of CO2 emitted per capita (World
Bank, 2014), whereas the EU average is 7,3 tons per capita and 0,8 tons per capita for the Sub-
Saharian average. It is therefore clearly not an urgent issue for Mozambique to cut down on CO2
emissions  compared  to  the  EU  –  and  even  compared  to  the  surrounding  countries.  Thus,  the
international discourse on climate change mitigation and the EU as an actor, which transfers certain
norms and values through the interaction with ACP conutires – and Mozambique in this case – is
prevailing.  Furthermore,  it  is  beneficial  for Mozambique that the EU wants to import  biofuels,
because  the  biofuel  demand  from the  EU can  help  create  the  national  sector  in  Mozambique
(Ministry of Enrgy, 2014). Due to these findings, the EU exerts power over Mozambique not only
in terms of self-interest but also in regards to legitimacy, because the EU is seen as a legitimate
actor based on its norms and values in the field of climate and energy. Meanwhile, it is pertinent to
analyse if these norms are of any value and contributing to a sustainable development. This will be
investigated in the following section. 
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9.2. Real partnership or continued dependency as a form of colonial legacy?
Sustainable development  is  listed as an objective of European integration in  the Lisbon Treaty
(Dinan, 2010), thus this notion has a prominent place in the character and self-identification of the
Union.  Aticle  11  TFEU  also  reflects  this  identity  connected  to  environment  and  sustainable
development  by  stating  “Environmental  protection  requirements  must  be  integrated  in  the  the
definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activitives in particular with a view to
promoting sustainable development”. The EU's guiding principles of sustainable development and
good governance in the Union's external relations are a culmination of norms and practices, which
makes the EU a normative power in world politics (Manner, 2008). The self-image and the Union’s
strong commitment to sustainable development, distinguishes the EU from other international actors
(Dinan, 2010). The EU has used its ODA instrumental in a way, which has enhanced the Union’s
legitmacy on the international arena (Carbone, 2013b). Following this, the EU has a desire to shape
the discourse globally on international aid, which is reflected by the Union’s contributions to the
different international fora dealing with aid. The EU’s common position is clearly visible in the
2005 Paris  Declaration  on  Aid effectiveness  and the  2008 Accra  Agenda for  Action  (Carbone,
2013b). A crucial reason underlying the adoption of the European Consensus on Development16 was
a clear belief that the EU provides ODA in a different way than other international donors with the
Union’s  distinct  way  to  promote  development  (Carbone,  2013b).  Global  debates  on  aid
effectiveness culminated in the early 2000s with several high level meetings, which in 2005 led to
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness17 (Gomes, 2013). Following this, the discussion on aid
effectiveness has taken place during almost a decade at the high-level with the meetings in Paris
2005  and  Accra  2008  as  aforementioned,  and  most  recently  in  Busan  2011  (Carbone,  2014;
Carmeron and Low, 2012). The  Busan Statement reaffirms the calls from the  Accra Agenda for
Action about a shift from aid effectiveness to development outcomes (Carmeron and Low, 2012).
Nevertheless, despite recognition by the receipient of aid of the first Paris Principle on ownership of
development  policy,  the  dependecy  and  assymentrical  relations  between  the  donor  and  the
receipient countries are not taken into account sufficiently by the aid effectiveness (Gomes, 2013). 
16 The policy document from 2005 guiding the EU’s development policy for seven years and 
reaffirming the commitment to PCD
17 This declaration contains five principles, namely country ownership, alignment, harmonisation, 
managing for development results, and mutual accountability
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This  support  my  argument  about  the  discrepancy  between  the  discursive  coherence  and  the
performed coherence and is further highlightened by what Holland and Doige (2012) call  “perverse
effect” of the Lomé Convention. Namely that the of ACP dependency on raw materials as an export
base in exchange for importing primarily industrial goods from Europe was promoted through the
Lomé  Convention.  Consenquently,  I  argue  that  this  is  also  the  case  today  with  biofuels  in
Mozambique – to  some degree – since it  is  mainly foreign European investors  and companies
providing the facilities and experitse in the biofuel production sector and it is the rural areas in
Mozambique, which provide the biofuel crops with the overall aim to export to the EU market. It
can be argued that this is to some extent the same case for biofuels in Mozambique, since the whole
sector is now on standby due to financial problems of the companies dominating the sector. These
companies are mainly European and focus on the European market, which makes Mozambique the
provider of natural resources for consumption within the EU.
9.3. Biofuels a valid option for sustainable development?
The reason why biofuels as a means of reducing GHG and climate change has been so disputed is
that often the most profitable way of getting land to produce biofuels is to clear rainforest, savanna,
or grassland. As a result of burning these types of biomass, carbon is released in enormous amounts,
which then in turn negate any GHG saving coming from biofuels for decades and even centuries
(Tilman et  al.  2009). This is also sometimes referred to as “carbon debt”. To be environmental
sustainable biofuels should be produced from crops with lower GHG emissions in their total life-
cycle than traditional fossil fuels, and there should be no or little competition with food production.
Furthermore they should not cause direct or indirect land-use change. If these requirements are
fulfilled biofuels make a good substitute to fossil  fuels  (Tilman et  al.  2009).  Hence the key to
carbon gains in relation to biofuels is to use land, which initially does not contain large amounts of
carbon in either its soil or vegetation, while at the same time being able to produce an abundant
amount of biomass (Tilman et  al.  2009). If this is not the case great amount of carbon will be
relased to the atmosphere, when the land is cleared and thus, land-use change emission will occur
undermining the actual gain of using biofuels instead of fossil fuels. An example of such a land, is
the double cropping, where two crops are grown around the year. This means that after harvest of
the “original”  crop the biofuel  crop is  planted and the soil,  which is  otherwise unused several
months every can accommodate biofuel production (Tilman et al. 2009). Hence, no addotional land
will be cleared and there will be no competition with food production. 
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With the second revision of the CPA signed in June 2012 the combat against climate change was
identified as a major challenges, which needed to be addressed. Furthermore the EU also made a
commitment to increase the PC of the Union’s other policies with the development policy (Pape,
2013).  This  contrats  with  the  issues  on  the  enivronmental  impacts  in  the  countries  producing
biofuels that have been raised in connection to biofuels as well as biofuel production’s effect on
land-use change and increasing prices on agriculture commodities (Nelson and Robertson, 2008).
Moreover,  the  revision  of  the  CPA made  it  clear  that  the  development  policy  should  tackle
inequalities and devote a particular focus on giving poor people better access to land, food, water
and energy, while not harming the environment (EC, 2011). If biofuels are not providing better
access to land, food, water, and energy but in contrast exaggerbates all the former as the case of
ProCana  in  Mozambique  as  well  as  it  was  confirmed  by a  local  NGO (WE Effect,  2014)  in
Mozambique  show,  it  reflects  incoherence  and  questions  the  EU’s  legitimacy.  Following  this
Carbone argues that such a gap creates problems for the EU’s legitimacy in the international arena.
When the commitments are only symbolic and detached from actual performance, it has a direct
impact on EU’s international  legitimacy (Carbone,  2013b).  Furthermore when tensions between
norms and interests arise witin the EU, it challenge the legitimacy of the EU as well as the Union’s
self-proclaimed  identify  as  being  a  champion  of  the  developing  countries’ interests  (Carbone,
2013b).
Whereas it is generally accepted that the EU is a norm provider setting normative frameworks for
others to follow, it is, however, also well-recognised that its implementation of these norms are not
as  good  (Smith,  2013).  Accordingly  Siles-Brügge  (2014)  challenges  that  the  EU  is  a  unique
normative actor and that the trade and development policies are driven by distinct imperatives.
Along these lines, it is questioned how desireable the current trade-development nexus is from the
perspective of developing countries. Siles-Brügge shows how the reform of the General System of
Preferences  (GSP) scheme is  more  a  move to  improve the  EU’s  leverage  in  negotiations  with
emerging economies rather than an effort to improve the GPS for the neediest as it is justified in
terms  of  development.  Consequently,  this  questions  to  what  extent  the  establishment  of  liberal
markets, in which European companies can compete, contribute to the economic development of
the developing countries. Since the EU is the most important provider of market access to these
countries, it is relevant to ask whether or not the primary goal of the Union’s trade policy towards
these countries is to create liberal markets for the benefit of its domestic firms (Siles-Brügge 2014). 
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This is also applicable in terms of the EU’s energy policy and the case of Mozambique, where the
vast majority of the companies investing in the biofuel sector was European. Thus, in the wake of
the  policy  objective  of  10%  biofuel  in  the  transport  sector,  European  companies  went  to
Mozambique in search for business opportunities to meet the coming demand for biofuels in the
European market. The development of the biofuel sector was then heavily based on the European
demand for biofuels and subordinated to this was the provision of biofuel to the domestic market
and energy development in Mozambique. As one of the Mozambican government representatives
expressed, one of the big problems for the future of the biofuel sector in Mozambique is that the
foreign  companies  have  financial  problems  (CEPAGRI,  2014;  ODI,  2014).  Since  these  are
dominating the sector, it is on standby for the moment and the land that was allocated to biofuels is
not being cultivated or used for anything else. Additionally, since jatropha has not responded and
giving yields as expected, the biofuel sector is on stand-by in Mozambique (CEPAGRI, 2014). This
also supports my argument of the “perverse effect” of ACP dependency on the EU18. So the EU
might transfer norms of sustainability to be followed in the biofuel sector in Mozambique but when
the  EU's  demand  for  biofuels  and  the  European  companies  dominating  the  biofuel  sector  in
Mozambique do not fulfill  the expectations,  it  creates problems in Mozambique with a biofuel
sector put on standby. 
9.4. What is working for what and for whom - in the landscape perceived performance and 
the discursive performance
It is argued that there has been “much ado about nothing” (Carbone, 2014:114) from the EU’s side.
In  all  international  foras  on  aid  effectivenss  e.g.  Paris,  Accra,  and  Busan,  the  EU  leadership
aspirations have remained largely unfulfilled and in reality the political commiments made are not
being  transferred  into  action  (Carbone,  2014).  In  regards  to  the  achievement  of  the  MGDs
Mozambique  will  “potentially”  by 2015 reduced  to  half  the  proportion  of  people  living  under
extremely poverty as well as attain the target of reducing the proportion of people suffering from
hunger to half (World Bank, 2012:7).
Young and Peterson (2013) discuss the nature of a policy nexus and that it has two different aspects
relating this to development policy i.e. trade and development, with trade  as  development policy
and considerations of development in trade. 
18 See the section ”Real partnership or continued dependency as a form of colonial legacy” for 
the reference to Holland and Doige (2012:57)
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For the purpose of the thesis it means that in the latter case development considerations are present
in the energy policy and for the former that energy policy works as development policy. Whereas
development considerations in energy policy does not seems like a foreign concept with the EU’s
legal obligations of PCD – although the practice might appear different as discussed elsewhere in
this thesis – energy policy as development may appear out of place or as an alienation of both
development policy and energy policy. Nevertheless, energy has been identified as a main issue in
international development with the UN initiative Sustainable Energy for All. This was laucnhed in
September 2011 and fous on universal energy access, energy efficientcy,  and renewable energy.
These three objectives should be achieved by 2030 (UN, 2013). Even the EU has created its own
energy initiative and this clearly shows how important energy has become for development. The
access to and use of fossil fuels have also provided the Western World with the society we know
today with an economy based on fossil fuels. This stresses the importance of the development-
energy nexus and reiterate the crucial character of PCD in particular this area. A relevant question
for the policy-makers in the EU is thus, how energy can forster the development – also a sustainable
one. In this way energy can become the catalyst of development in third world countries without
compromising food security,  good governance,  the rule  of law,  or  undermining climate change
mitigation. But before all this can become reality the implications of EU’s energy policy must be
critically  scrutinised  providing  a  comprehensive  policy  framework  to  secure  truly  sustainable
sources  of  renewable energy and security of  energy.  This means that  the biofuel  sector  should
promote better access to energy and provide economic development in the rural areas as it is stated
in the agreement for development cooperation (EC, 2007). Meanwhile,  only two percent of the
people in rural areas is connected to a grid-based electrification and with 70% of the country’s
population living in rural areas, the vast majority of Mozambicans rely on biomass for electricity
i.e.  charcoal,  wood, agricultural  waste,  and animal manure (World Bank, 2012).  This is despite
Mozambique’s  significant  energy resources.  The  country  has  one  of  the  biggstest  hydropower
installations in Africa, the Cahora Bassa dam, which generates 85% of the country’s total energy
production capacity, and Mozambique has the potential to become of the biggest energy producers
on the African continent. However most of the energy produced is exported to other countries in the
region,  mainly  South  Africa,  and  Mozambique  has  one  of  the  lowest  electricification  rates  in
Southern Africa with only 15% of the total households having access to electricity, whereas half of
these people live in the capital Maputo or its surroundings (World Bank, 2012). 
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Another 35% of the population is considered “chonically food insecure” (World Bank 2012:21), and
the increasing droughts due to climate change could worsen this further. 
The EU itself claims that PCD is essiential for the Union's credibility as a global actor. Moreover,
the EU delegations in third countries have an important role in keeping PCD issues on the agenda
with  the  regular  dialogue  conducted  with  the  partner  countries  (EC,  2013b).  Meanwhile  it  is
difficult to assess if this is actually the case on the ground. Firstly because the language is weak and
to what degree should the delegations “keep” PCD on the agenda? Additionally, it depends on the
individual staff to be aware of potential policy conflicts in the supported projects in Mozambique
and generally there is only a focus on trade in connection to PCD (EU delegation, 2014). In fact one
of the staff interviewed at the EU delegation in Maputo had not heard about the connection of
energy and development policy in regards to PCD before. In the same vein with every financial
proposal the delegation staff has to fill in a form but there are no guidelines on the 20-20-20 targets
and PCD but one of the staff members expressed it “would be useful to have” (EU delegation,
2014). Thus, despite clear objetives of ensuring PCD with legal commitments in the Lisbon Treaty
as well as in the CPA and Agenda for Change, there is a discrepancy in the implementation and lack
of guidelines provided to the EU delegations in third countries.
In 11th  EDF there is  no mentioning of  biofuels  but  there is  a focus  on rural  development  (EU
delegation,  2014).  There  is  therefore  no  direct  link  between  EU  support  of  biofuels  in  the
development policy. However, the interview with the EU delegation in Maputo showed that there
was a need to have clearer instructions on PDC and guidelines in this regard to the 20-20-20 targets
– although these targets are a part of an internal EU policy.
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10. Conclusion
The EU has since its inception had a legal framework about the relations to ACP countries. As the
time went by the support to specific third countries i.e. former colonies of EU MS has developed
and the EU is today the world's biggest donor of ODA. During the decades more countries have
become part of the ACP group and the nature of development assistance has also changed. The EU's
development policy is mainly directed towards the ACP countries and this cooperation is directed
by  the  CPA,  whereas  the  overall  development  policy  applicaple  to  also  non-ACP  states  is
determined by the policy document Agenda for Chance from 2012. As a former Portuguese colony
Mozambique being a country classififed as low-income and among the poorest in the world as well
as one of the most aid dependent countries, PCD is highly relevant for Mozambique. Additionally,
Mozambique has also been the target of the global land rush in the pursuit of biofuel production. It
is therefore pertinent to examine the presence of PCD and the case of biofuels in Mozambique in
connection  to  EU's  energy  and  development  policy.  The  EU  –  a  self-proclaimed  leader  in
environmental politics – has adopted ambitious climate change targets, which have had implications
for the Union's energy policy. Thus, by 2020 renewable energy should consitute 20% of the energy
mix. In the transport  sector 10% of the energy should come from biofuels.  These targets have
resulted in the adoption of RED in order to achive the 20% renewable energy and the 10% biofuels.
This  has  in  turn  driven land investments  in  Mozambique mainly by European companies.  The
specific features of Mozambique as being a land abundant country with good climate conditions for
biofuel  cultivation  as  well  as  low labour  costs,  have created  a  surge  for  land and initiation  of
numerous biofuel projects in Mozambique. Although the country has a very progressive land law to
protect the rights of rural communities and the country has developed its own sustainability criteria,
there have nevertheless been issues with the so-called landgrabbing and rural livelihoods have in
some cases been compromised. However, studies have also shown that the impact of biofuels on
food security and land does not differ compared to other agro-industrial crops.
Meanwhile, despite that the EU has a legal commitment in the Lisbon Treaty to ensure PCD and
that  sustainable  development  is  a  main  objective  for  the  Union's  external  relations,  there  is  a
discrepancy  between  that  discursive  coherence  and  the  performed  coherence  in  the  case  of
Mozambique. This discrepancy steams from a lack of horizontal cohernece between the EU energy
policy  and  the  development  policy.  Thus,  the  implications  of  the  EU's  energy  policy  on  the
development policy are a lack of horizontal coherence in the energy-development policy nexus.
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As I showed in the theoretical discussion about policy coherence, the notion of horizontal coherence
can be connected to outcome coherence and the results of a policy. Despite a clear discourse on
PCD and its subsequent importance, the EU faces challenges to adhere to the commitments made
about PCD and ensuring that not only external policies are coherent but also that internal policies
such as energy policy does not undermine objectives set in the devleopment policy. The interviews
conducted in Mozambique confirmed that there is a lack of instructions and guidelines concerning
policy coherence between the 20-20-20 targets and development aid in the context of Mozambique.
Thus, my analysis shows that there is a strong presence of discursive coherenece despite a lack a de
facto/performed coherence on the ground – in this case Mozambique. 
The lack of coherence undermines the EU's legitimacy as an international actor in general but also
as a champigion of development as well as an enrivonmental leader. When it comes to the former
the legitimacy of EU development assistance can be questioned if the claimed objectives of food
security and energy security in the Mozambican context are undermined by export of biofuels to the
EU, which demand these biofuels to fulfil internal climate and energy targets. Although, there has
not been any export of biofuels to the EU yet, the EU is an explicit target market for the biofuels
produced  in  Mozambique.  This  was  confirmed  by  several  sources  during  the  field  work  in
Mozambique  e.g.  NGOs,  the  Government  as  well  as  the  private  sector.  Secondly,  the  EU's
legitimacy as an international leader in envimental politics can be questiond if the means by which
the  EU  is  pursuing  its  ambitious  climate  and  energy  objectives  are  actually  undermining  the
reduction of GHG as well as the mitigation of climate change. These issues have been raised in
connection to biofuels and questions have been raised about the actual gain of GHG reduction due
to ILUC in the production of biofuels.
Although it remains difficult to assess the outcomes of multiple policies such as the development-
energy nexus, it  is pertinent for the EU to improve its PCD not only for the sake of mitigating
climate change but also to safeguard its international legitimacy. An actor which takes away with
one hand what it gives with another hand loses credibility. The EU itself has indeed claimed that
PCD is important for its international credibility. Therefore the discrepancy between the discursive
coherence and the performed coherence should be eliminated both for the sake of EU's legitimacy
but also for the sake of sustainable development as well as the well-being of the rural communities
in Mozambique.
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Appendix 1
Interviews in Mozambique – 8 in total
 Boris Atanassov – Independent consultant
 Claudio James – Director General Petrogás, part of PetroMoc
 Hélio Neves  - Head of Analyse and Information Department CEPAGRI
 Jorge Manuel Manjate – Natural Resources Manager Biofuels Programme CEPAGRI
 Marta Susana – Directorate for Renewable Energy, Ministry of Energy
 Diamantino Nhampossa, WE Effect, NGO representative 
 Tankar, Centro Terra Vida, NGO representative
 Giancarlo Monteforte (rural development) and Ana Margarida Tome De Freitas Mariguesa 
Lorentzen (infrastructure and energy), EU delgation
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